
JPRS 84018

2 August 1983



# West Europe Report

No. 2182

19980630 160

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

**FBIS** 

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

78 AØ5 JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in <u>Government Reports Announcements</u> issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the <u>Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications</u> issued by the <u>Superintendent of Documents</u>, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

## JPRS 84018

# 2 August 1983

# WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 2182

# CONTENTS

# TERRORISM

SPAIN		
,	ZEN Extension Proposal Symptomatic of Deeper Socioeconomic Woes (ABC, 22 Jun 83)	1
	ENERGY ECONOMICS	
TURKEY		
	Sketch of Growing National Energy Needs (TERCUMAN, 28 Jun 83)	3
	Overview of Thermal Power Plant Capacities (MILLIYET, 29 Jun 83)	
	Natural Gas Strike on Thrace's Umurca Wells (TERCUMAN, 28 Jun 83)	8
SPAIN	ECONOMIC	
	Solchaga Continues Promoting Industrial Reconversion (DIARIO, 11 Jun 83)	10
	Four-Year Economic Plan Under Scrutiny (M. Ordonez; ABC, 18 May 83)	12
	PSOE Scored For Fiscal, Social Failure (ABC, 13 Jun 83)	14
	Solchaga on Reconversion Costs, Steel Industry (ABC, 22 Jun 83)	17

	Madrid Labor Councillor on Curbing Unemployment (A. Cuenca Interview; YA, 22 Jun 83)	19
	Mixed Indicators Mark Industrial Sector Health (J. Ayuso, ABC, 22 Jun 83)	22
TURKEY		
	Ozyoruk Surveys Cost of Living Burdens (M. Ozyoruk; TERCUMAN, 28 Jun 83)	25
	Civil Service Salaries, Ranks To Be Standardized (B. Eskinat; MILLIYET, 29 Jun 83)	27
	POLITICAL	
CYPRUS		
	De Cuellar, TFSC Officials on Latest Cypriot Positions (TERCUMAN, 5 Jul 83)	29
DENMAR	K	
	Schluter in Faeroes Discusses Oil, Fisheries, Air Transport (BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 6, 8, 9 Jul 83)	31
	Aircraft Monitoring To Be Modernized Faeroes' Hydrocarbons Pact Adopted Schluter Discusses Visit, Issues, by H. R. Larsen	
PORTUG	AL	
	Optimistic Attitude of CDS Toward Future Reported (O DIA, TEMPO, 30 Jun 83)	34
	Pires Voices Views Reorganization Planned	
	Policy of Cooperation With Former Colonies Discussed (DIARIO DE LISBOA, 29 Jun 83; J. Rosa; TEMPO, 30 Jun 83)	37
	Military Cooperation Planned Cooperation Termed Treason	
TURKEY		
	Erel Does Not View Ersin as Threat to Democracy (T. Erel; MILLIYET, 29 Jun 83)	39
•	Soysal Argues for MDP-ANAP Coalition Approach (M. Soysal; MILLIYET, 29 Jun 83)	42
	- b -	

Major Shakeup in Leadership of SODEP  (TERCUMAN, 28 Jun 83)	44
SODEP Organizational Work in Southern Areas (CUMHURIYET, 5 Jul 83)	46
ANAP Leader Ozal Holds News Conference (CUMHURIYET, 5 Jul 83)	48
MILITARY	
DENMARK	
Minister To Consider Changes in Conscription System (D. Axel, BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 6 Jul 83)	50
Colonel's Article on Weaknesses in Defense Brings Reactions (Various authors; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, various dates)	52
Morale, Discipline, Readiness Problems Economy Seen Setting Restraints Home Guard Problems Discussed Defense Will, Readiness	
FRANCE	
Defense Strategy Analyzed Based on Strategic, Tactical Forces (Gen R. Horgues-Debat; DEFENSE, Mar 83)	65

TERRORISM SPAIN

ZEN EXTENSION PROPOSAL SYMPTOMATIC OF DEEPER SOCIOECONOMIC WOES

Madrid ABC in Spanish 22 Jun 83 p 15

[Text] In the coming months, according to an announcement by the minister of interior himself, plans similar to the ZEN (Special Northern Zone) will be applied throughout Spanish territory. Thus, the constitutional regime's new security system, now in effect in the Basque provinces, is to become something more than a limited police response to the specific serious situation prevailing there and, apparently, to be transformed into the heart of a general public order policy.

Perhaps one of the most serious national failures associated with the transition from dictatorship to democracy has been neglect of internal security, the maintenance of which is government's basic duty. This failure, moreover seems to have been based on a subconscious rejection of the political presumption of need. It was a reaction to Spain's having emerged from non-democratic rule, for, under that rule, stress was placed exclusively on public order to the detriment of the political liberties that characterize Western systems of pluralism.

Seven years of political democracy and deterioration of internal security justify the demand that this vacuum be filled. The growing threat of terrorism, which has proclaimed its intention to transfer its activities to areas outside the Basque Country, and the quantitative and qualitative growth of crime fostered by the socio-economic crisis have increased the collective awareness of insecurity, together with social pressures for effective corrective measures. The fact, besides, that the present government, in contrast to previous ones, is not inhibited by the association of any of its members with the dictatorial regime gives it the necessary freedom of action to take appropriate measures.

If there are grounds for criticism regarding the application of secruity measures, as there are grounds for criticism of any political or human endeavor, the criticism should not be, at the beginning, because of possible excesses, as is the criticism made by professional liberals or indirect collaborators with terrorism. The equivocal attitude of some ministers and the majority of government deputies and socialist leaders will, unfortunately, make the execution of such measures difficult. Confusing the exercise of authority with the absence of freedom, they are putting up a

series of obstacles to prevent the ZEN plan from being applied even where its application is most urgent. Ingenuously, they would like to enjoy the trappings of power without bearing their weight.

Authority and freedom form an indissoluble symbiosis. Indeed, the nonexistence of the former will lead inexorably to the disappearance of the latter. When society's need for security, which grows in times of crisis, is not satisfied by democracy, society sooner or later looks for other methods that are marginally legal or illegal to satisfy it. Those who ignore or downplay this political axiom are those who help undermine the system.

12336

ENERGY ECONOMICS TURKEY

#### SKETCH OF GROWING NATIONAL ENERGY NEEDS

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 28 Jun 83 p 7

[Text] Ankara--Despite the enormous progress made in electrical energy production in the 60 years since the declaration of the Republic, Turkey's energy shortfall is growing.

Sixty years ago, the young Republic of Turkey had only 29 power stations—two of them being metropolitan power stations—and a total annual electrical energy output of 77 million kilowatt—hours. Today, Turkey has "653 power stations and and total annual electricity output of 25.932 billion kilowatt—hours." Even so, the production fails to meet the demand. The shortage is particularly prevalent in the industrial sector.

In the 23 years since Turkey started to plan its development in 1960, the country's electrical energy production has quadrupled, but its energy consumption has risen by a factor of 8.8. As a result of this gap as well as delays in the realization of investments, Turkey is unable to rid itself of power cuts and darkness.

In addition to leaving the country in the dark and the cold, the energy shortage is causing drops in production, higher unemployment, fewer investments, higher inflation, drops in national income and other negative effects on the economy. Noting that a total of 5.5 billion kilowatt-hours of electrical energy was cut back between 1977 and 1979 as a result of the energy crisis, experts point to Turkey's economic problems caused by the energy shortage of the past years. In view of these facts, ways are being sought to relieve the energy shortage—which will keep its place on the economic agenda for the next 20 years as Turkey's foremost problem—and to formulate a "national energy policy."

#### The Ataturk Dam

Meanwhile, the contract for building the Ataturk Dam, which will relieve a major portion of Turkey's energy shortage, will be awarded in August. With an installed capacity of 2,430 megawatts, the Ataturk Dam--whose cornerstone is expected to be laid on 29 October--will be the "mammoth work" of the Republic. When it goes into operation in 1994 with all of its eight units, the dam will produce 8.1 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity a year.

Fourteen Dams Under Construction

The 14 dams and hydroelectric power stations currently being built by the DSI [State Hydraulic Affairs Directorate General] and their production capacities are as follows:

### Dam Annual Production Capacity (kilowatt-hours)

Karakaya Altinkaya Oymapinar Hasanugurlu-3 and 4 Gezende Catalan Aslantas Menzelet Kilickaya Kokluce Adiguzel Kapulukaya Karacaoren	7,354,000,000 1,632,000,000 1,620,000,000 397,000,000 528,000,000 509,000,000 334,000,000 332,000,000 584,000,000 280,000,000 190,000,000
<u>-</u>	

These 14 dams under construction will all have gone into operation by 1988 and will increase Turkey's electrical energy output by 23.301 billion kilowatt-hours a year.

Meanwhile, TEK [Turkish Electric Power Enterprise Directorate General] is building 12 thermal power stations. These installations, which include such mammoth thermal power stations as Elbistan, Yatagan, Soma, Cayirhan and Yenikoy, are targeted for completion in 1986. If the program attains its goals and if these 12 thermal power stations are completed, they will increase Turkey's annual electrical energy output by 21.360 billion kilowatt-hours. Thus, by the end of 1988 our electrical energy production will rise to 70 billion kilowatt-hours a year. But even that will not be enough to meet the demand that is rising as a result of the country's population growth and rapid industrialization.

Faced with a growing electrical energy shortage, the DSI wants nine new dam and hydroelectric power station projects included in the next five-year plan. The nine hydroelectric power station projects that the DSI wants included in the next five-year plan and their annual production capacities are as follows:

Kayraktepe: 991 million kilowatt-hours; Boyabat: 1.468 billion kilowatt-hours; Peri Ozluce: 413 million kilowatt-hours; Peri Munzur: 48 million kilowatt-hours; Ilisu: 3.678 billion kilowatt-hours; Batman: 459 million kilowatt-hours; Karasu: 31 million kilowatt-hours; Dogancay: 148 million kilowatt-hours.

9588

CSO: 3554/356

ENERGY ECONOMICS TURKEY

#### OVERVIEW OF THERMAL POWER PLANT CAPACITIES

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 29 Jun 83 p 7

[Text] Ankara--The major projects report of the State Planning Organization Coordination Chairmanship lists 14 Turkish Electric Power Enterprise projects as major projects and states that, of those projects, 11 are thermal power plants, one is a nuclear power plant, one is a natural steam power plant and one is a gas turbine power plant.

The report says that, among the said projects, the first and second units of the Soma-B Thermal Power Plant have started production in parallel and that the first unit of the Yatagan Thermal Power Plant went into production in October 1982.

The report provides the following data on the said projects:

Afsin Elbistan-A Thermal Power Plant: With an installed capacity of four 340-megawatt units, this plant will have an annual output of 8 billion kilowatt-hours. Energy production units, machinery and equipment for the project were contracted in 11 main packages. The contract for consulting and engineering services was awarded to a five-company consortium headed by the firm Fichtner. The main buildings of all the units are reported to have been completed except for some detail work and auxiliary foundations. Detail work on these buildings is continuing. The construction of other auxiliary buildings is continuing on schedule and without delays. It is reported that 96 percent of the materials needed for the plant and 84 percent of the assembly equipment and fittings have already been delivered and that 35 percent of the assembly of the plant is complete.

Cayirhan Thermal Power Plant: With an installed capacity of two 150-megawatt units, this plant will have a total annual output of 1.7 billion kilowatt-hours. The plant's turbogenerator installations have been contracted to Mitsubishi of Japan, its steam generation plant has been contracted to SGP of Austria and its measurement and control systems have been contracted to Siemens of West Germany. The delivery of equipment and materials for the construction site and for the plant's high-voltage substations is continuing in parallel with construction and assembly work. Various cranes to be used in the plant have also been contracted and 60 percent of the cranes have already been manufactured.

Yatagan I and II Thermal Power Plant: This plant, which with an installed capacity of two 210-megawatt units will have an annual output of 2.5 billion kilowatt-hours, has been contracted on credit to Elektrim of Poland as a turnkey delivery project. Unit I of the plant went on line in October 1982 and by the end of the year had produced 147 million kilowatt-hours of electricity. Unit II has been planned to go on line in the first half of 1983.

Yeni Catalgazi Thermal Power Plant: With an installed capacity of one 150-megawatt unit, this plant will have a total annual output of 1 billion kilowatt-hours. Foreign purchases for this plan will be contracted in packages and on credit. The plant's turbogenerators have been contracted to Transelektro of Hungary and its power and production substations have been contracted to Elin of Austria. Preparations are complete for contracting the plant's heating and air conditioning installations, general assembly and cranes. The construction of part of the plant's social activities complex and administrative and cafeteria buildings has also been completed.

Soma-B I and II Thermal Power Plant: With an installed capacity of two 165-megawatt units, this plant will have a total annual output of 2 billion kilowatt-hours. Both units of this plant have gone on line, but they are operating at below capacity and intermittently because of various malfunctions. As of the end of December 1982, the plant had produced 315 million kilowatt-hours of electricity.

Tuncbilek-B I and II Thermal Power Plant: This plant, which with an installed capacity of two 150-megawatt units will have an annual output of 1.8 billion kilowatt-hours, has been contracted as a turnkey delivery project to a consortium headed by Kraftwerk of West Germany and consisting of Elektrim of Poland and Enka and Kutlutas of Turkey. Unit I was approved and delivered in 1980, while the coal-crushing installations, the social activities complex and the ash disposal system of Unit II have largely been completed.

Orhaneli Thermal Power Plant: The construction of this plant, which with an installed capacity of one 200-megawatt unit will have an annual output of 1.2 billion kilowatt-hours, is proceeding within the framework of the Turkish-Soviet Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement. So far 4,900 metric tons of equipment and materials procured from the Soviet Union have gone into the investment field. Work is also under way for contracting coal furnaces and coal transportation facilities for the plant.

Yenikoy Thermal Power Plant: This plant, which with an installed capacity of two 210-megawatt units will have an annual output of 2.4 billion kilowatt-hours, has been contracted to Elektrim of Poland as a turnkey delivery project and the necessary agreements have been signed. The firm is currently doing plant layout, excavation and basic construction work on the bunker-boiler structures. The construction and assembly of the administrative building and prefabricated employee living quarters have been completed.

Yatagan III Thermal Power Plant: This plant, which with an installed capacity of one 210-megawatt unit will have an annual output of 1.2 billion kilowatt-hours, has been contracted to Elektrim of Polandas a turnkey delivery project and the necessary agreements have been signed. Construction work corresponding to code 0

of the boiler and steam-generation departments has been completed. Deliveries of materials and equipment are continuing for the construction of the cooling towers and the installation of the turbines.

Keles Thermal Power Plant: With an installed capacity of one 200-megawatt unit, this plant will have an annual output of 1.2 billion kilowatt-hours. Part of the initial work on the feasibility report for the plant has been completed. The site for the plant has been selected. At this stage, foundation studies and land expropriation procedures can begin.

Kangal Thermal Power Plant: With an installed capacity of two 150-megawatt units, this plant will have an annual output of 1.8 billion kilowatt-hours. The plant's turbogenerator installations have been contracted to Mitsubishi of Japan and its measurement and control systems have been contracted to Siemens of West Germany. Ninety percent of the infrastructure work on main and auxiliary structures has been completed. Deliveries of materials and equipment are continuing for the construction of the social activities complex, the installation of the drinking and industrial water distribution system and the building of the steam-generation installations.

The nuclear power plant: With an installed capacity of 1,000 megawatts, this plant will have an annual output of 6 billion kilowatt-hours. The plant's electrical and mechanical contracts have not yet been awarded. Project work is continuing on the plant's infrastructure and auxiliary installations. Credit arrangements needed to invite foreign bids on the main blocks of the plant have not yet been resolved.

The geothermal power plant: With an installed capacity of 17.8 megawatts, this plant will have an annual output of 100 million kilowatt-hours. GIE of Italy, which was awarded the contract for building the plant, has completed its manufacturing work and has delivered all materials and equipment to the construction site. So far 1,400 metric tons of materials and equipment have been delivered. The plant was expected to go into operation at the beginning of 1983.

Aliaga Hybrid Gas Turbine Power Plant: This plant, which with an installed capacity of two 30-megawatt units will have an annual output of 400 million kilowatt-hours, was supposed to have been completed in 1982. As a result of problems in the procurement of certain materials and equipment to be imported, the plant's completion date has been put off to 1983.

9588

CSO: 3554/357

ENERGY ECONOMICS TURKEY

#### NATURAL GAS STRIKE IN THRACE'S UMURCA WELLS

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 28 Jun 83 p 7

[Text] Hope is gushing out of the ground in Thrace, the segment of the European part of the Ottoman Empire that remains within our borders today. Hope is gushing out of Hamitabat, Devecatagi, Yesilgol, Kepirtepe, Vakiflar, Umurca, Eskitasli and Turgutbey.

While piercing the blue skies of Thrace, the towers of hope are also drilling the Thracian earth. The drilling rigs, which rise 42 meters above the ground, can drill as far down as 6,000 meters below ground. The drill bits of the towers of hope are being "tempered" with the sweat of everyone working at the Turkish Petroleum Corporation [TPAO], everyone from the engineer to the worker, from the geologist to the guard, from the foreman to the janitor. And natural gas is gushing out of Thrace, the segment of the European part of the Ottoman Empire that remains within our borders today.

Crews working under TPAO's drilling and production senior engineers in Thrace are covering the area around Luleburgaz and Tekirdag with holes. The technological war that has been waged in Thrace for the past few years has now ended with the victory of the Turkish engineers and workers. Eight out of every ten wells drilled hit upon rich and high-pressure natural gas beds. In the Hamitabat region of Luleburgaz, 18 natural gas wells are currently connected to distribution stations and are ready for production. The natural gas from the Hamitabat region served the Turkish industry for the first time by powering the Pinarhisar Cement Factory. Natural gas from Hamitabat will now be used to meet the fuel needs of the Thrace Glass Factory, which is located on the E-5 highway between Corlu and Luleburgaz. Currently, 6 and 8-inch natural gas pipes are being laid in the 40-kilometer span between the Hamitabat Natural Gas Distribution Station and the Thrace Glass Factory. The natural gas pipeline was contracted for 40 million Turkish liras.

#### The Umurca Wells

Meanwhile, in the Umurca region, where drilling work began last year, seven wells have been drilled so far. Among these, high-pressure natural gas was found in Umurca-01, Umurca-02 and Umurca-04. These wells have been made ready for production. However, tests are still continuing to measure the natural gas reserves in these wells. Natural gas was also found in the wells Umurca-06,

Umurca-C1 and Umurca-C2. Drilling and production tests are also continuing. Among the seven wells drilled in the Umurca region, only Umurca-O3 yielded nonfeasible amounts of gas. New drilling rigs are also being built in Kepirtepe.

The "gas of hope" that has been gushing out of Thrace without end was most recently found--together with oil--in the well Turgutbey-2 in the Eskitasli region which lies between Hamitabat and Umurca. In Turgutbey-2, which has been drilled down to 4,200 meters below ground, natural gas was found at 2,500 meters and oil was found at 3,800 meters.

Feasibility studies are currently under way on putting the entire natural gas output of Thrace at the service of the industrial sector. Initially, the TPAO will deliver the Thracian gas to the Anbarli Thermal Power Station via a high-capacity pipeline. The pipeline will then be extended through Istanbul to the Izmit Industrial Zone and Gemlik. Even if the natural gas from Thrace is used only to meet the fuel needs of the Anbarli Thermal Power Station, Turkey will save \$476,222,000 in foreign exchange. The Anbarli Thermal Power Station consumes 6,000 metric tons of fuel oil each day. This translates into 40 percent of Turkey's annual fuel oil imports.

9588

CSO: 3554/356

ECONOMIC

#### SOLCHAGA CONTINUES PROMOTING INDUSTRIAL RECONVERSION

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 11 Jun 83 p 16

[Text] Madrid--"We have to convey to all of Spain that a reconversion process is not only a process of the reduction of capacity and the loss of jobs. We must convince all of Spain that a reconversion process is a process of saving jobs and the industrial fabric of the country," stated the minister of industry and energy, Carlos Solchaga, during the course of an informative luncheon of the Union of Iron and Steel Companies (UNISED) that followed a meeting of the general board.

During his appearance before the executives of the iron and steel industry, Carlos Solchaga pointed out that it is necessary to inform the unions that they will have to find a way to protect the largest possible number of jobs, but added that the businessmen "must be careful to act responsibly, thinking in terms of the sector and forgetting petty selfishness in order to decide which plants should be closed and in what order."

"Negotiations should be carried out—added Carlos Solchaga—keeping in mind that the sector must be saved and that all of us, unions, businessmen and government, must keep a tight rein." In regard to this the minister of industry and energy stated, as he did during his presentation to the communications media of the "White Book on reconversion", that the government will help "those who first help the government".

Solchaga, who indicated that he wanted to carry a message of peace and of confidence in the future, analyzed the reality of the iron and steel industry in Spain, pointing out that in this field "it never rains but it pours." "The main problem—he added—is the delay with which previous Spanish administrations in general have tackled the process of restructuring the sector. He emphasized that the government intends to deal seriously with the reconversion and stated that regarding this matter "only in 1981 was an effort made in this country, and the results have not been favorable."

He emphasized that "a reconversion process is not one that applies poultices to problems. A reconversion process is one that guarantees the sector's foreign competitiveness." In this regard, the minister of industry and energy explained to the UNESID businessmen that the government had reached the conclusion that "the thing that is most costly for the Spanish iron and

steel industry is the continuation of the indifferent attitude that the Spanish authorities have maintained up to the present."

Regarding the talks regularly engaged in by the committee to monitor all the iron and steel industry as it faces the restructuring of the sector, Carlos Solchaga pointed out that "the government is going to go to extremes in order to reach an agreement," but added that if it happens that the "concerned parties do not want to face their responsibility, the government will assume it," and he reiterated that if this committee does not reach an agreement by 1 July, the iron and steel sector will face reconversion by decree. In relation to the problems of the special steel, he stated that in this sector "a genuine reconversion plan does not exist yet."

9907

ECONOMIC

FOUR-YEAR ECONOMIC PLAN UNDER SCRUTINY

Madrid ABC in Spanish 18 May 83 p 55

[Article by Miguel Angel Fernandez Ordonez: "Four-Year Plan: The Agreement Will Be Reached Without an Economic or Social Council"]

[Text] On Friday the 20th, the Secretary General for Economics and Planning, Miguel Muniz, will be handed the documentation gathered by 40 interministerial working groups set up to draft the four-year economic plan. This information will be submitted for close scrutiny and by the end of June there will be a preview of the working basis with which to begin coordination contacts with the various economic and social forces of the country. The four-year plan will be submitted together with the overall state budget on 1 October.

According to sources from the Ministry of Economy, Social Security is the topic of greatest concern to the government since "it constitutes almost half of the plan." The same sources next referred to the labor market, in the sense of providing the necessary flexibility formulas that will allow the creation of new jobs, as the next most important topic of concern. Another topic of priority is transportation.

The established working group has practically finished the laws governing the plan and in very advanced stages is the law creating the Economic and Social Council destined to be the forum where the principal features of the plan will be negotiated and agreed upon with workers and enterprises. Nevertheless, it is not expected that this law, which is in its draft phase, be submitted to Parliament at a future date since its enforcement is not considered necessary at the initial drafting state of the economic plan. Economic sources pointed out that due to the sliding nature of the plan, the function of the Economic and Social Council could be merged at any time into the dynamics of drafting the plan.

Forty Working Groups

The forty working groups are grouped according to the nature of their investigations. The "vertical groups" are concerned with the different economic sectors: agriculture, industry, etc. The "horizontal groups" take care of matters such as financial reform, social security, labor market, etc., which

are of interest to all groups. Finally, "global" groups are concerned with the general economic situation and the possible scenarios whereby the Spanish economy could develop in the next four years. All of them are taking an inventory of problems, and prioritizing those considered as objectives.

The same economic sources have stressed the complexity of the work under way taking into consideration the diversity of the Spanish economy, the extensive relations of each group, and the vast interchange of necessary "paperwork" among them. A diagnosis of the economic and social situation of autonomous communities can also be found in these works.

#### Adjustment Without Stabilization

According to the secretary general for economy and planification, the government's plan does not in any way call for an increase in bureaucratic interventionism, but rather states that its principal mission is to clear up uncertainties and accomplish an adjustment to the economy in terms of employment, competition, and modernization to overcome the crisis. At the same time, he points out that it is impossible to accomplish this adjustment within a year, "because then we would be in a stabilization plan." The plan will be of a sliding nature, that is, after revising the plan's provisions and the parameters of its makeup, each fiscal year will be prolonged for an additional year. According to Miguel Muniz, this sliding nature has the advantage of permanently maintaining the horizon for the next four years; it provides flexibility vis-a-vis current complexities in relation to the international economy and the plans of autonomous communities; and besides allows one to take into consideration annual economic trends.

The secretary general for economics and planning assures that the government's medium-range sectorial and regional macroeconomic policy constitute an orientation in which the private sector has at its disposal with all the privileges demanded by firms, consumers, and citizens in general. Or as the minister for economy often states, they are trying to prove there's a solution to the crisis.

The government will confine the plan to public sector programs that will last for several years with regards to budgets, public investments, public enterprises, credit, and all that falls under the State. "There is no doubt," states the secretary general for economics and planning, "that one of the main uncertainties that can be explained with the utmost clarity and functionality is the role of the public sector, and its definition should be of an imperative nature, compatible with the necessary flexibility."

The provisions point out that the plan will be drafted in three phases: During the first phase, there will be a preview of the plan which will be fundamentally comprised of general objectives, priorities, the medium-term macroeconomic picture, economic policies with regard to the fundamental imbalances and the major lines of regional and sectorial policy. During the second phase, the government will be presenting the public sector programs which pertain to the policies and objectives pointed out in the first phase. Lastly, a plan will be drafted that will confront the crisis from a social standpoint. In reality, rather than to reach definite sums, they are trying to draw up two or three possible scenarios in which the economic evolution of the coming months will be set forth.

12352

ECONOMIC

PSOE SCORED FOR FISCAL, SOCIAL FAILURE

Madrid ABC in Spanish 13 Jun 83 p 15

[ABC Editorial: "The Economic Suffocation"]

[Text] It can be accepted that the budget deficit is one more instrument of economic policy, as the minister of finance and economy said to a full session of congress in defense of the delayed 1983 budget, which is still being debated after more than half the current year has bone by. But in terms of good economic theory it is more exact to state that the deficit is a discordant instrument in the orchestra.

Even leaving aside the not insignificant subject of the magnitude of the deficit, the cause of this could be either of two completely different factors: carrying out or increasing public investments or the subsidizing of consumption. The difference is not one of degree. A deficit as a response to the creative impulse of wealth, which should be the result of public investment, might deserve approval, even though the creative impulse of private investment is always more effective. But a deficit whose only purpose is to finance public consumption is utterly objectionable.

Facing a deficit generated by expenditures, the idea of redistribution that justifies taxes is weakened and taxpayers are relegated to the unpleasant role of forced subsidizers of futile administrative costs. The major part of the 1983 budget deficit is of this nature. It is, as we say, a badly played instrument that is discordant and spoils the orchestral harmony.

Although the budgets were presented as "transitional" and "restrictive" of spending, they show a deficit of 1,111,196 million, that is to say, over a billion pesetas, A clear idea of the magnitude of this amount is given by the fact that this is higher than the total of any of the Spanish budgets from 1969 to 1975 (let us not forget that the energy crisis set off public expenditures starting in 1974). And it should be evident that we make this allusion because it corresponds to years during which large-scale public works were still being carried out and the economic depression had not yet started.

The consequences could not be more negative for the national economy: the deficit should be covered within a certain period of time because, as deputy

Pedro Schwartz has stated, "the three wise men are not going to come by on January 6 and pay it." A series of shocking repercussions have surfaced. If more money is issued to cover it, inflation worsens and unemployment increases. If it is covered by issuing public debentures, the volume of investment going to the private sector will be diminished in the same proportion, and this will produce a reduction of activity in this sector, which will also mean more unemployment. If an appeal for financing is made to the Banco de Espana, the net result will be two evils: inflation and the allotment of credits for expenditures that generate no wealth whatever.

But the deficit will have yet another dreadful consequence due to its tremendous magnitude. The inflation created in covering it, as well as the public debentures issued for this purpose and the financing from the Banco de Espana, if recourse is made to it, will be in a large part carried over to the coming years. And then, if public spending is not curtailed once and for all, the general economic situation will deteriorate to a really dangerous degree.

But the deficit will have yet another dreadful consequence due to its tremendous magnitude. The inflation created in covering it, as well as the public debentures issued for this purpose and the financing from the Banco de Espana, if recourse is made to it, will be in a large part carried over to the coming years. And then, if public spending is not curtailed once and for all, the general economic situation will deteriorate to a really dangerous degree.

The following examples show how a deficit gets larger as time goes by: In 1981 the public deficit was equivalent to 3 percent of the gross national product; in 1982 it reached 6 percent of the GNP. By the end of 1983 it will certainly be larger.

How high can inflation go before the progressive loss of the currency's buying power converts paper money into worthless documents? How much can public debt accumulate without discrediting the issuance of money and exhausting the capacity of the subscribers? To what limit, because it must have one, can the Banco de Espana offer financing? In brief, what heights of great governmental power over general progressive impoverishment, can be reached without producing the virtual disappearance of human rights, which would be impossible to exercise in a society whose revenues of all types would be absorbed, confiscated by the state?

For democracy to take hold, it is a necessary condition that economic power should remain in the hands of society without being added to the state's political power. When the state hoards both, totalitarianism is born. For this reason democracies established and maintained through the use of force in the Eastern European countries are not true democracies, even though they are cynically denominated "popular".

in the ribtal new or seed by the ext

If this is the aim of the changes proposed by Socialism, and if it is to be carried out by imposing on the Spanish economy an unredeemable pledge of

public debts, the surprise that millions of PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] voters will experience will be recorded in political annals as one of the greatest electoral frauds in memory. And if the socialist government has attributed the problems of the present crisis, with its policies of unrestrained public expenditures, of continued and increasing deficits, to the negative inheritance received from the previous administration, the truth is that it will leave its successors not merely a bad inheritance but a devastated society.

The seriousness of such a perspective of devastation lies in the fact that if socialism carries out its program, this will be irreversible and inevitable, since it either plans and nationalizes or it is not socialist. What is paradoxical is that in order to alleviate the seriousness, the program would have to renounce itself. Enough contradiction is expressed by the so often quoted example of Mitterrand's orthodoxy, against whose deleterious consequences Spanish Socialism is forewarned, and avoids to the greatest extent possible, with pragmatic moderation, the application of its postulates. What kind of faith does a political program inspire that is overwhelmingly accepted at the polls, but whose success consists in hibernation, as advised by the nearest example of its failure?

9907

ECONOMIC

SOLCHAGA ON RECONVERSION COSTS, STEEL INDUSTRY

Madrid ABC in Spanish 22 Jun 83 p 55

[Text] The industrial reconversion process will cost between 500 billion and 1 trillion pesetas, said Minister of Industry and Energy Carlos Solchaga yesterday after the meeting of the Socialist Parliamentary Group, where he reported on his ministry's projects in that area.

Carlos Solchaga met with journalists after the closed session of his group at the Congress of Deputies. He stressed the need to carry out industrial reconversion. "Otherwise," he claimed, "half the sectors that are now in crisis could go bankrupt over the next 4 years." The minister contended that this decision cannot be delayed. "This is the challenge," he added, "that any government faces, and I think that so far none of the previous administrations has dared to take the bull by the horns and tell the naked truth to the nation: We have lost a million industrial jobs over the last 10 years, and our industrial exports are declining."

The minister of industry and energy also told journalists that employment is being reduced by the industrial crisis, and reconversion implies an effort to guarantee the survival of jobs. "This effort involves a payroll adjustment that could affect 50,000 to 60,000 people in the short term."

Carlos Solchaga presented this same explanation to his Parliamentary Group, to whom he outlined the general features of the white book on industrial reconversion and reindustrialization in the country.

Iron and Steel Reconversion

The president of the National Iron and Steel Enterprise, Inc. (ENSIDESA) and Altos Hornos del Mediterraneo, Jose Maria Lucia, told Efe that the recoversion of the integral iron and steel industry could cost the country nearly 500 billion pesetas, and that employment will be cut by 10,000 jobs. He pointed out, however, that these measures will save the state 1.2 trillion pesetas over the next 10 years, "assuming that the sector does not undergo a massive shut-down of facilities in the meantime." The distribution of the 10,000 jobs that will be lost soon in the sector is, according to the president of the Iron and Steel Division of National Institute of Industry (INI), as follows: ENSIDESA will lose 5,000 jobs; Altos Hornos de Vizcaya, 3,000; and Altos Hornos del Mediterraneo will have to cut its payroll by 2,000 people.

Later on, Jose Maria Lucia asserted that the reconversion of the integral iron and steel industry is 5 or 6 years behind that process in the other countries of the Community, "although it will enable us to make the sector profitable by 1988." He indicated that after the sector is restructured, production in the integral iron and steel industry of Spain will amount to about 7 million tons, keeping Spain in its current position in world industry.

8926

#### MADRID LABOR COUNCILLOR ON CURBING UNEMPLOYMENT

Madrid YA in Spanish 22 Jun 83 p 19

[Interview with Agapito Ramos Cuenca, councillor of labor, industry and commerce for the Community of Madrid, by Margarita Jimenez; date, time and place not given]

[Text] In the last 9 years a pocket of unemployment has been created, amounting to 17 percent of the labor force, and Madrid has lost 220,000 jobs. Furthermore, more than 150,000 youths under the age of 25 are out of work, of whom 120,000 have never had a job. In view of these statistics obtained from the president of the government of Madrid, Joquin Leguina, in his inaugural speech, he stated that "the battle against unemployment should be, and is, not the primary objective but a veritable obsession in any public institution, as it is, I am certain, for all of us." He added to this the limitations of the Community.

The councillor of labor, industry and commerce for the Community of Madrid is Agapito Ramos Cuenca, a 42-year-old native of Madrid who has a wife and two children. A labor lawyer, he has worked in the legal section of the French Democratic Confederation of Labor (CFDT), served as an adviser to the General Union of Workers (UGT), been honorary professor at the Autonomous University in the School of Labor Law, and participated in the creation and direction of the Federation of Socialist Parties, having joined the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE).

In his view, the party's platform and the inaugural speech as well are realistic in their conclusion that unemployment is the entire country's business, and has international implications.

"Clearly this does not mean that nothing can be done. We believe that something can be done in the short term, although I would like to make it perfectly clear that until January, this Council Ministry will not have jurisdiction over industry. We must build confidence, and in light of the country's political stability, we must encourage entrepreneurs to invest. We must not let it be said that only the Socialists make public investment in opposition to the city. We must encourage investment because the problem of business investment is not a matter of social or political risk, but exclusively a question of business risk. It is that climate that we will try to create beginning in January, when the first transfers are made. Here is where the

plan for establishing a regional economic development institute comes into play."

Agapito Ramos tells us that such an institute would have two focuses, consulting and providing information or training for businessmen. Additionally, with the consent of the partners, it would also do something with the labor unions. This would provide an opening for industrial development associations.

"The only measure we can take in the Community of Madrid is for all investments made by the Community, to the extent that transfers can be made, to generate jobs. The Employment Institute, which logically should be run by the Community because it is closer to the people, the jobless in this case, is outside our purview. We must devise mechanisms in Madrid so that all partners may play a more active role in our industrial configuration, and shore up the sectors we perceive as the neediest."

We asked about the Socialists' reluctance to mention the solution of unemployment in their platform, and the willingness on the part of the Popular Group and the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), particularly the latter, to deal with the issue.

"In any campaign speech it is permissible for every group to make whatever promises and engage in whatever demagoguery it deems necessary. But when it comes to the alternatives for segregating the industrial crisis, I think the Workers Commissions (CCOO), the UGT and management have to work harder to find solutions, because the existing alternatives are either very vague or very general. The CCOO talks a lot about unemployment insurance, which we will not undertake at this time. There must be a concerted effort by all parties involved. I do not intend to lapse into a kind of interventionism at all costs in industry and labor affairs."

[Question] If all cooperate, how long will it take to eradicate unemployment?

[Answer] I think that during these 4 years we will not be capable of absorbing it, unless there is a national and international economic situation highly favorable to the reactivation of the entire economy. It would be wonderful if Madrid were able to obtain a proportional number of those 800,000 jobs that have been talked of so much in the national government. I think an almost basic objective is not to allow unemployment to increase in Madrid, and we feel that is attainable.

Although his ministry does not yet have jurisdiction over that area, the councillor's office has already been exposed to the problems of industries in crisis, which Agapito Ramos finds even more disturbing.

[Question] Do you favor socializing businesses? What value does private initiative have for the labor councillor?

[Answer] In no way do I favor socialization. I would be delighted if private investment and the entrepreneurs of Madrid, both actual and potential, were capable not only of assuming responsibility for all the technical supports

required by their own investments, but also of generating sufficient employment so that we could play the role of arbitrators. I personally believe that private initiative is healthy. The problem I would not like to have to face is the absence of private initiative, but I do not at all feel that such is the case. I believe that in Madrid the CEIM [expansion unknown] and the businessmen are willing to reinvest or to invest for the first time, and we in turn are willing to give them all the support necessary for those investments; that does not prevent us from having a minority share under certain circumstances and in certain cases, to provide stimuli and to support incentives.

8926

ECONOMIC

MIXED INDICATORS MARK INDUSTRIAL SECTOR HEALTH

Madrid ABC in Spanish 22 Jun 83 p 55

[Article by Javier Ayuso]

[Text] The Spanish economic situation at the end of the first quarter of the year shows some signs of recovery in the industrial sectors. At least that is what can be deduced from the statistics, which indicate an increase in industrial production—except in April, in the demand for electricity and the demand for fuels, between January and April of 1983. In light of these figures, in business and banking circles there are expectations of a change in the trend over the coming month, although that optimism still falls short of official forecasts.

The various indices that reflect the cyclical situation of Spanish industry have revealed a positive trend for the first 4 months of the year. The Index of Industrial Production of the National Statistics Institute, as well as the variations in consumption of electricity and gasoil (quite reliable indices of the economic picture), show a considerable improvement during that period in comparison with last year. This has led the study services of various private entities to express more optimism with regard to the economic results of 1983, though they do not parallel the excessively optimistic official predictions. The latter place the growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at 2 percent for this year. The negative side is offered by the Industrial Situation Survey conducted by the Ministry of Industry and Energy, which shows a decline in demand and production in April.

#### Favorable Impression

Although the economic indicators may still be retarded and there are no precise figures, the impressions gathered by ABC from various economic sources and from reading the latest available data (see chart) are better than those corresponding to the first 4 months of 1982. The latest economic studies of two major national banks (Central and Bilbao), which this newspaper obtained, echo this cautious optimism. Central's study points out that "despite the low levels of industrial production and the uncertainty of the crisis, the economic prospects are more favorable, above all boosted by what appears to be the beginning of the end of the crisis in the United States, which could be provide an impetus for other countries in crisis." The Bank of Bilbao Study Service, on the other hand, asserts that "the profoundly pessimistic situa-

tion that some observers had foreseen for 1983 will not become a reality. The GDP is moving upward, by less than the 2 percent predicted by the government, but above the zero growth rate indicated by some agencies. Although the difference may not be noticeable, this growth, no matter how small, is a sign of vitality not to be overlooked. The Spanish economy, in terms of activity, is no better and no worse off than that of the other countries in our part of the world."

These impressions are corroborated with some of the figures included in the chart. From these data it can be seen that Spanish industrial activity in the first 4 months of 1983 has surpassed that of the same period of 1982 by at least 2 points. As is well known, the first months of last year were marked by a severe industrial slump, which was overcome by the spring; but activity fell off again toward the end of the year. In contrast, this year the recovery has been taking place almost since January, as reflected especially in the particularly high demand for electricity and gasoil for vehicular use in January and February.

#### Negative Side

As for businessmen's opinions, the latest available statistics are equivocal, with some discrepancies with this optimistic viewpoint. According to the Industrial Situation Survey of the Ministry of Industry and Energy, which was provided to ABC, in April there was an increase in the rate of activity in the construction sector, with prospects for new improvements in the short run. On the other hand, during that month there was a contraction of industrial demand (a decline in the backlog of orders and a slight rise in inventories), a drop in production compared to the previous month (an increase compared to April 1982), and some slightly lower forecasts for the coming months.

The businessmen polled indicated that during that month there was a contraction of industrial activity due to oscillation around some levels that reflect the stagnation of the economy. The prospects for the next few months are not too optimistic either, although they are rather vague, since some factors have improved and others declined. The Industrial Situation Survey is definitely more pessimistic than the analyses put out by the aforementioned private entities.

#### Industrial Situation

		January	February	March	April
Industrial Production (1)	1982	- 3.2	2.6	1.7	-1.3
	1983	5.8	3.1	(-)	(-)
Demand for Electricity (2)		- 4.0	- 2.3	5.7	2.2
	1983	8.1	7.1	- 0.3	4.6
Automotive Gasoil (3)	1982	0.9	0.4	5.4	5.1
	1983	9.5	1.9	5.6	0.2
Backlog of Orders (4)	1982	-39.0	-34.0	-34.0	-31.0
	1983	-38.0	-38.0	<b>-40.</b> 0	-44.0
Production over prior	1982	- 9.0	+ 7.0	+17.0	- 8.0
month (4)	1983	<b>- 7.</b> 0	- 2.0	+17.0	-15.0
Production Trend (4)	1982	+10.0	+ 9.0	+ 5.0	+ 7.0

January February March April Production Trend (4) 1983 + 8.0 + 9.0 + 5.0 +1.0

Source: ABC compilation

Rate of variation of IPI over same month of prior year. INE.
 Rate of variation of domestic consumption of electricity. UNESA.

(3) Rate of variation of type A gasoil, for vehicular use. CAMPSA.(4) Difference of net opinion. Industrial Situation Survey, Ministry of Industry and Energy.

8926

ECONOMIC

OZYORUK SURVEYS COST OF LIVING BURDENS

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 28 Jun 83 p 7

["Your Decision" column by Mukbil Ozyoruk: "Distant Connections"]

[Text] Men who are the heads of their families and who are buried in their work or have too many problems to worry about in their business do not know exactly where the high cost of living began and cannot give you individual examples. Sometimes they even forget the price of an item they buy from the market. If they have been asked to bring a few things and if they have been able to buy a few or many things at the same time, they will remember only the total amount they have spent; they will not be able to recall the price of perhaps any single item. But in the final count they know very well what "high cost of living" means, because those with fixed incomes in particular are fully aware that the burden on their shoulders is getting increasingly heavier. As weeks, months and years pass, their money has been getting "inadequate" and the kitchen has been needing more and more money despite the periodic raises given by their employers or the government. Monthly electricity, gas, water and telephone bills have risen to figures that virtually equal the "annual totals" of the old days. Spending allowances given to children have begun to get inadequate. Fares paid for commuting have begun to "hurt." The money paid for the "second resoling" of the shoe has almost become equal to the original price of the shoe. The dinner table is being left more frequently without jam or fruits. While it was possible to go "somewhere" even during short holidays in the old days. annual vacations became "worrisome" at first and have now turned into "rests at home" or "rests while fixing the house." Or, vacations have taken the form of one-week to ten-day "lodging visits" to relatives or friends who live in resort-like places. Or, if a way has been found, efforts are under way to migrate to a "company resort." The head of the family does not know on what date or by how much the burden on his shoulders is increasing. He only feels the weight which makes it hard for him to breathe. On the second week of some months, he starts asking: "What is happening? Am I losing money in the streets? Am I being robbed?" Housewives and mothers complain all the time, but they, too, cannot account for what is happening and appear to have lost control over spending. They start saying: "Believe me, I am not spending any money needlessly, but I still do not know or understand where the money is going." However, it is obvious why the burden on the father's shoulders is increasing and why the "kitchen funds" appear to have been squandered. The reason for all these is "inflation."

They analyzed the figures compiled by the State Statistical Institute and they found out that annual per capita income rose by six times between 1978 and 1982 from 30,000 Turkish liras to 186,000 Turkish liras. But when these figures were adjusted to 1968 "constant prices", they found out that the annual per capita income dropped from 4,852 Turkish liras—in 1968 terms—in 1978 to 4,796 Turkish liras in 1982. In other words, not only has it "stopped" rising, but it has "dropped." So then, what happened to the 156,000—lira rise between 30,000 Turkish liras and 186,000 Turkish liras? In 1978, one U.S. dollar was equivalent to 25 Turkish liras. Today it is worth almost ten times that. But 186,000 Turkish liras today is not worth ten times what 30,000 Turkish liras was worth in 1978. In 1978, one Republic gold coin was worth 2,400 Turkish liras. Today it is worth ten times that.

The year when per capita income fell most since 1978 was 1980, that is the year the 24 January decisions began to be implemented. Since then, there has been a real growth "trend." At this point, which we have reached thanks to the "effectiveness" given to the 24 January decisions by the authority of 12 September and the fact that those decisions have been fully implemented, economic analysts are saying that we may return to the "level of 1978" for the first time since 1978 if we can achieve a growth rate of 4.8 percent in 1983 and if we can hold inflation down to 20 percent for the year.

1978 and afterwards... The time elapsed until the 24 January decisions could truly take "effect"... One finds it hard to forget.

9588

CSO: 3554/355

ECONOMICS TURKEY

CIVIL SERVICE SALARIES, RANKS TO BE STANDARDIZED

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 29 Jun 83 p 3

[Report by Bulent Eskinat]

[Text] An edict with the force of law has been prepared in connection with "the reorganization and the working code of the ministries" to insure the speedy, productive and orderly operation of the ministries. Minister of Finance Adnan Baser Kafaoglu said in connection with the edict, which is expected to be published next week: "This way, establishing or abolishing ministries and hiring employees by the instructions of the ministers will be done in accordance with the law."

Noting that an edict on this issue was issued on 27 February 1982, Kafaoglu said: "However, there have been complaints about that edict. Furthermore, that edict has lost its authority to issue a new edict." He added that the new edict that has been prepared will eliminate most of the malfunctions observed in the old edict.

Pointing out that certain offices that have been designated as directorates general have been operating as department heads, the minister said: "Or, an office that has been set up as a department head has been operating as a directorate general. According to this edict, if an organization has been set up as a directorate general it will operate as a directorate general and if it has been set up as a department head it will operate as a department head."

Stating that currently a person who is known as a "department head" in one organization is referred to by another title in another organization, Kafaoglu said that the new edict will bring orderliness to such issues. He said: "From now on there will not be different titles in every ministry. There will be a standardization of titles." The minister continued:

"The central administration of each ministry will be organized such that it will be able to formulate goals and policies in connection with the services it is supposed to provide; to plan, allocate and procure resources; to perform such functions as administration, coordination, auditing, supervision and organizational development; and to govern the entire ministry.

"In the central administration of the ministries, the hierarchical positions at the disposal of the minister and their titles will be:

```
"--Undersecretary;
"--Director general;
"--Department head;
"--Group head;
"--Branch head;
"--Section chief;
"--Clerk.
```

"By this edict, which has the force of law, the hierarchy in all the ministries will be like this. The edict standardizes the titles."

Noting that everyone at the same level of hierarchy will get the same salary, the minister said: "There may be slight variations, but in general same level administrators will get the same salary."

Explaining that establishing or abolishing ministries will from now on be possible only within the provisions of the law, Kafaoglu concluded:

"In the past, governments could form new ministries or abolish old ones. Now they will be able to do that only within the provisions of the law. Furthermore, it will no longer be possible to hire people by the instructions of the minister. According to the edict, it will be possible to rename departments only with the approval of the Council of Ministers. Increasing the allocated number of personnel of a department will also be subject to the provisions of the law."

9588 CSO: 3554/355 POLITICAL

DE CUELLAR, TFSC OFFICIALS ON LATEST CYPRIOT POSITIONS

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 5 Jul 83 p 4

[Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] GENEVA (AKAJANS) - President of the Federated State of Cyprus Rauf Denktas had another meeting yesterday with United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar in Geneva. In the declaration he made after the meeting to an AKAJANS correspondent Denktas pointed out that Greeks should stop viewing themselves as the people of Cyprus and he said /"If they do not do this, we made it clear that Greeks will become even more intractable when we sit down for intercommunal talks."/

The President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus Rauf Denktas specifically said the following in his declaration:

/"The Greeks wish to resume the intercommunal talks which they sabotaged by going to the United Nations General Assembly. And I came to Geneva to state the Turkish views.

We stressed the fact that Greeks must give up their attitude that Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus are a different people, whose existence and status they deny, viewing us as minorities and themselves as the real people of Cyprus. And we made it clear that if they do not do this to sit down for intercommunal talks will make the Greeks even more intractable.

The Secretary General was very understanding. The Secretary General said that the talks had been set up in order to evolve a federation and that in order to evolve a federation it was obvious that the parties who sat at the table should accept each other as equals.."/

On the other hand, Chairman of the Legal and Political Affairs of the Federated Turkish Cypriot Assembly Fuat Veziroglu also stated that he had submitted to the assembly last week a draft about independence through self-determination and he said /"My personal opinion is that there will be a declaration of an independent state before the end of the year."/

Veziroglu said the following on the subject of the independence of the TFSC:

/"The united Nations resolution concerning Cyprus, passed in May, constituted a turning point for the people of Cyprus. For the Turkish population of Cyprus, the Greek side leaving the two to one negotiating table to resort to international organizations has reached a point which they cannot tolerate. When the view that

Greeks are a nation and ourselves a people was expressed, this coming on top of the Greek attitude caused the notion of our founding our own independent state to gain ground. For that reason, the Federated Assembly stressed "self-determination" on June 17. Following that, last week I submitted to the Assembly a draft law for obtaining independence through self-determination. The Federated Assembly will debate it and pass it as soon as possible; Cyprus will become very soon an independent nation.

My personal opinion is that the declaration of an independent nations will be made before the end of the year. The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus has reached a point at which it can no longer listen to Turkey on this matter. In fact the referendum was submitted on Friday and it was to be passed on that same day. But this was deferred upon the request of Mr. Denktas to submit the matter to the United Nations Secretary General. If Turkey interferes in this matter the people of Cyprus will not listen. Denktas does not want to find himself in the position of leaving the people of Cyprus in midstream."/

12278

CSO: 3554/364

POLITICAL DENMARK

SCHLUTER IN FAEROES DISCUSSES OIL, FISHERIES, AIR TRANSPORT

Aircraft Monitoring to be Modernized

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Jul 83 p 3

[Text] Prime Minister Poul Schluter received a request Tuesday from the Faeroese fishing industry to make greater efforts to insure the Faeroese fishermen their share of the capelin quota in the fishing between Iceland and Greenland.

The request was made by Director Andreas Lava Olsen from the fishmeal factory in Fuglefjord. He blamed the government for overlooking Faeroese interests in the area and for leaving to Iceland and Norway the determination on how many capelin are to be fished between Greenland and Iceland.

Poul Schluter made no comment on the criticism, which was made on the third day of his first visit to the Faeroe Islands. The visit ends Friday.

On a round trip by bus, inspection cutter, and inspection ship to the northern islands, the Prime Minister visited the airfield in Morkedal that monitors the air space around the Faeroe Islands by radar and that is to be modernized in the next three years at a cost of 130 million kroner.

The Prime Minister also visited Fuglefjord, Videreydi, and Klaksvig. Wednesday he will sail with the inspection ship "Beskyttern" to the southern islands and visit Vag, Akraberg, and Tvaera.

Faeroes' Hydrocarbons Pact Adopted

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 8 Jul 83 p 3

[Text] The Faeroese government yielded Thursday to the Danish government and approved future negotiations on the exploitation of raw materials in the Faeroese substratum on the basis of the principle of equality that applies to Greenland's substratum. This was the result of Prime Minister Poul Schluter's negotiations with the government.

The agreement implies that Denmark and the Faeroe Islands will share equally the profits of a possible oil venture, and that decisions on research and development presuppose that both parties are in agreement. The Danish and the

Faeroese governments hereby obtain mutual veto rights.

The details of a Faeroese arrangement on raw materials within the framework of the law on home rule will be worked out by a very fast-working committee in which both governments will be represented by an equal number of members. The committee will have a Faeroe Islander as chairman and will make a draft for an agreement "with the greatest possible consideration of Faeroese interests."

This means, according to what was reported to Ritzaus Bureau, that the equality principle of Greenland will be made into an agreement that will also conform to Faeroese conditions and wishes. Thus the Faeroe Islanders' agreement will be a copy of the agreement between Greenland and Denmark.

It has still not been decided whether the income of a future development of raw materials will be subtracted from the Danish subsidy to the Faeroe Islands, which at present is about 400 million kroner a year.

The negotiations between Denmark and the Faeroe Islands on a raw materials agreement have gone on for several years, and the Danish Faeroese agreement to set up a substratum committee is a step on the way to an agreement that will establish the framework for the exploitation of the possible oil and gas deposits south of the Faeroe Islands.

English geologists rate the chances of finding oil and gas as good, and test boring at Sudero island has shown traces of gas at a depth of 2.4 kilometers.

The exploitation of possible oil and gas deposits has in any case only long-range prospects, because oil companies with their present technology can hardly manage to work at the ocean depths that are being considered. The Faeroese continental shelf covers a small part of the economic zone of the Faeroe Islands and 200 miles out into the Atlantic Ocean.

Schluter Discusses Visit, Issues

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Jul 83 p 5

[Article by Helle Ravn Larsen: "Successful Visit to the Faeroe Islands"]

[Text] "The visit to the Faeroe Islands was extremely successful and the political discussions quite positive. Naturally there are problems, but both sides have shown a clear will to solve the problems in a relaxed and reasonable way."

Prime Minister Poul Schluter said this to BERLINGSKE when he landed yesterday at Kastrup after four days visit to the Faeroe Islands.

The Prime Minister emphasized that he had only found understanding and friendliness with the authorities and the politicians he had talked with and also with the other people he met -- more than he had dared hope for. Schluter could remember only one unpleasant Faeroe Islander. He was the editor of a magazone, 14 SEPTEMBER, whom Schluter had refused to give an interview to in the middle of the night on the exploitation of raw materials in the Faeroese substratum.

The discussions between the Prime Minister and the government resulted in a decision to act according to the principle of equality and to divide the profits of drilling according to the same principle as the agreement between Denmark and Greenland.

The Prime Minister also discussed the educational situation, problems with the registry law in connection with the withholding tax on the Faeroes, and whaling.

"The Faeroe Islanders want an expansion of vocational schools so that in the future they can educate the people themselves to a higher level. Minister of Education Bertel Haarder will now be informed of the discussions," Schluter said.

Minister of Justice Erik Ninn-Hansen will also take part in the work following the Prime Minister's visit. He will plan the practical arrangements on the registry law when the withholding tax is introduced.

"The Faeroe Islanders should themselves pass a law on whaling so that they will bear the responsibility before the International Whaling Commission," Schluter said.

9124

cso: 3613/142

POLITICAL PORTUGAL

### OPTIMISTIC ATTITUDE OF CDS TOWARD FUTURE REPORTED

Pires Voices Views

Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 30 Jun 83 p 12

[Excerpt] Lucas Pires has announced that in the coming presidential elections, the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] will seek to support "a national candidate offering an alternative to the central bloc." In an interview granted to the Portuguese service of the BBC, the centrist leader indicated that he does not believe that any candidate for the presidency will emerge from General Eanes' sector.

In explaining his point of view, Lucas Pires said that it is important to know first of all "if the armed forces will basically give a candidate their blessing or not." In this connection, he said that he thinks it unlikely that a military candidate will emerge for the presidential election, stating that the new National Defense Law requires that any military officer transfer to the reserve before running for election. "Therefore, it is natural that some officers would not want to risk a career which might last a number of years longer on a wager which might be uncertain in terms of a candidacy."

When it was pointed out to him that he is normally viewed as a political leader enjoying a good relationship with Ramalho Eanes, Lucas Pires stressed that this is what everyone in Portugal wants. "Institutional solidarity and agreement between the president and the cabinet, in particular the present one, are necessary." He recalled that he has always insisted that "a small country in economic difficulty must find internal common forms of agreement in order to act, in particular in the foreign sector. It is normal," he concluded, "that the president of the republic and the cabinet should not engage in constant guerrilla warfare."

With regard to the new PS [Socialist Party]-PSD [Social Democratic Party] executive branch, the leader of the Christian Democrats predicted that it "will be the victim of its contradictions." He admitted though that "it has at least sufficient power to face up to the crisis." However, he said that the present government "is very much a prisoner, particularly of the UGT [General Union of Workers] and the conditions it has imposed and does impose for the formation of the executive branch." Lucas Pires says he believes that the government can and must stabilize the economic situation, but that "it cannot make the country take the leap that it needs."

"It is here that either an expanded CDS or a new Democratic Alliance will come into it," Lucas Pires commented. According to him, it is on this level that "our alternative will be felt, I believe during the next elections, or in principle 4 years from now."

In developing his reasoning, the CDS leader said that the Democratic Alliance is a postponed project, and that when it reemerges "it will be under new conditions," which may include "a majority CDS." Lucas Pires added that his party "is not in a hurry. We will fight for as long as is necessary, and we know that substantial political changes do not come about in a short time. Therefore we will try to demonstrate at every opportunity, and in the Parliament in particular, the strength of an alternative conviction."

## Reorganization Planned

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 30 Jun 83 p 12

[Article by Alves de Oliveira]

[Excerpt] The process of reorganizing the CDS ordered by the political commission of that party immediately after the last legislative elections has been stepped up considerably in recent days. Next weekend, a number of members of the centrist board of officers will meet with all of the district assemblies of the party in order to discuss the proposed reorganization, the planning of which is already rather well along, with the local cadres.

This plan, which had been basically drafted by the deputy secretary general, Dr Miguel Seabra, working with Dr Gomes de Almeida and Dr Joao Loureiro under the sponsorship of the president of the political commission, Dr Azevedo Soares, and the secretary general, Prof Vieira de Carvalho, will basically affect three essential points: the forms of party political action, reorganization of the central departments, and finally, revision of the bylaws where local organization is concerned.

#### New Methods of Intervention

In the realm of new methods of political action, the centrist leaders plan to undertake the revision of their party's program, making the structure of the governmental commission more dynamic and organizing a series of discussions on economic, social and cultural subjects in which some of the key national experts in these matters will participate. The first such discussion is to be held this coming October, and will deal with economic and social problems. Dr Joao Morais Leitao will be responsible for organizing it.

The updating of methods of political action by the CDS will further cover the reorganization of the party journal, FOLHA CDS, such as to strengthen its role in indoctrinating cadres.

## Rebalancing Finances

Within the reorganization of the central departments, the concerns of the Christian democratic leaders focus basically on updating organic structure

such as to make it more flexible and less bureaucratic, and also rebalancing party finances, which were seriously weakened by the last electoral campaign. In this connection, and if indeed the situation "is not worrisome," as a party leader told us, various procedures have been undertaken with a view to obtaining funds making it possible to cover the debts resulting from the elections, including in particular an increase in membership dues and the limiting of expenditures on the party apparatus.

# Stronger Local Organs

The basic aspect of the reorganization of the CDS is however to be the change in the bylaws on which the last party congress decided, with a view to strengthening the capacity for political action and the functional capability of the regional structures.

The plans for action in this sector will include giving local cadres greater responsibility, according to the main centrist leaders. This will be done, among other things, by establishing party goals to be achieved within given periods.

These measures should make it possible, on the one hand, to increase the efficiency of the local structures through their own dismissal of individuals incapable of keeping up with party development, while on the other hand reducing the petty internal questions, very often raised quite recently, which not only damage the public image of the CDS but also make it entirely nonfunctional in certain areas.

5157

CSO: 3542/160

POLITICAL PORTUGAL

### POLICY OF COOPERATION WITH FORMER COLONIES DISCUSSED

Military Cooperation Planned

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 29 Jun 83 p 5

[Text] The message sent by President Ramalho Eanes to President Samora Machel in connection with yet another anniversary of Mozambique's independence was published in Maputo. In his message, the Portuguese president indicated his desire for improved bilateral relations in the interests of both nations and with mutual advantages.

In Lisbon yesterday, Ramalho Eanes was represented by Adm Silva Horta, head of the Military Household of the Presidency of the Republic, at the reception hosted by the charge d'affaires of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Francisco Eria, in celebration of that country's national holiday. Others present representing the Portuguese government included Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaime Gama, Minister of Culture Coimbra Martins, Minister of State for Cooperation Gaspar da Silva, as well as "April Military Movement" leaders including Adm Rosa Coutinho, Lt Col Vitor Alves and Maj Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho.

## A Lesson

In an interview granted to the Mozambique News Agency (AIM), Maj Pinto Soares, who headed a Portuguese military delegation which spent 3 months in Mozambique, said that Maputo and Lisbon "will teach the world a lesson." "Eight years ago, they were faceless enemies. We went about firing at one another, but today we embrace each other and are developing another type of relations," he said.

The visit paid by this Portuguese military delegation to Mozambique was the result of the military cooperation agreement signed in November of last year, in accordance with which it was agreed that a team of Portuguese military engineers would study the plans for the new installations for the armed forces of Mozambique and the reconstruction of old military quarters.

Maj Pinto Soares said that during this mission, a study was drafted for the building of a military training center the first stage of which has already been completed. In a second stage, cadets from Mozambique are to come to Portugal to take officer training courses.

## Cooperation Termed Treason

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 30 Jun 83 p 27

[Editorial by Joao Rosa]

[Excerpt] Portugal is a member nation of NATO. Its formal reason for being is the need to take defense precautions against the threat of possible military aggression on the part of the members of the Warsaw Pact, the Eastern bloc, international communism.

Portugal is establishing closer relations, ever increasingly, with the Portuguese-speaking countries of Africa, its former colonies, which are in fact territories which are known to be fiefdoms of that same Eastern bloc, countries which have become communist and are the real strategic bases for that Russian threat. And this Portuguese cooperation with these current Soviet colonies has even been undertaken in the realm of military cooperation, as is publicly known.

Portugal is then, clearly and unequivocally committing an unspeakable act--it is betraying NATO.

However, the interpretation of this action by Mr Mota Pinto, for example, is quite different. In the high-sounding statements he made recently in Coimbra, our deputy prime minister and minister of defense made a point of stressing that, unlike what certain less logical minds might conclude, there was no inconsistency in this attitude by Portugal in belonging to NATO, on the one hand, and undertaking military cooperation maneuvers with those "Portuguese-speaking countries" on the other, training troops, providing equipment and theoretical knowledge which these present political and strategic colonies of the Eastern bloc—the enemies of NATO—might use to contribute in decisive fashion to Soviet hegemony over the free world, over democracy, over freedom, and against NATO.

This assertion by Mr Pinto appears to me in fact to be clear parody of his notorious "consistency," one which in truth merits no further comment.

5157

CSO: 3542/160

POLITICAL

EREL DOES NOT VIEW ERSIN AS THREAT TO DEMOCRACY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 29 Jun 83 p 6

[Article by Teoman Erel in the column "Telex": "Ersin Chief of General Staff"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The event for the days ahead is the change, tied to a resolution, which will be made in the position of Chief of General Staff. Just as we cautiously attempted to hint before, there will be no waiting until August to settle this matter and steps are being initiated at the beginning of July.

After General Kenan Evren, Commander of Land Forces General Nurettin Ersin is appointed to the number one command position of the Turkish Armed Forces. But Mr. Kenan Evren, as president of the Republic and chairman of the National Security Council, will continue with his duties as the leader of the 12 September Takeover, until the Presidential Assembly Council is established.

After November 6, when the Presidential Assembly Council has been established, General Ersin and the members of the Council will leave the ranks of the Turkish Armed Forces and will begin a new term of office that will last 6 years as /"The Presidential Council."/

As for President Evren, he will relinquish the chairmanship of the National Security Council on that same date and will begin his historic seven years of office as a civilian president.

These explanations we give are openly and clearly written in the articles which are part of the Constitution. They are established facts. But there are also advantages in recalling them and in reviewing whether developments conform to the articles of the Constitution, the agenda set by the Council and the promises which were made.

Let us take this opportunity to stress that the transition to civilian life is proceeding according to plan. The /"hierarchic"/ intervention of 12 September 1980 retains its character and progresses along the right path toward its goal.

As for General Ersin, his attaining the highest position for which every cadet yearns in his soul before setting aside the uniform he wore for 50 years, must be viewed as the manifestation of a logical consensus among his fellows. The 12 September hierarchy is not changing. But through an arrangement that eliminates the overcrowding in the upper echelons of the army, created by a military regime that lasted almost three years, relief is achieved.

We hope that matters will continue to progress from here in a normal and sensible manner, and we already congratulate General Ersin.

While the 12 September Takeover by the Armed Forces unfalteringly continues its progress on fundamental questions, are there no issues which ought to be rethought and amended?

The work related to the planning of future policies and the various steps taken do not appear to be satisfactory. As a matter of fact, careful thought must be given to thether it is possible to plan separately the civilian policy of the future.

Will it be possible to protect the positive results achieved by the 12 September at the cost of hard work and sacrifices, after going on to a civilian regime, by planning that civilian era step by step? Or rather, instead, through choices that will not lose sight of basic dynamics but will allow for differences inherent in civilian life?..

The idea that we consistently support in this column is to hand over the 12 September to as broad a sector of the population as possible and to the sagacity and attention of President Kenan Evren, who will serve at most another 7 year term of office.

The perception of right and justice which has been building up for centuries in the consciousness of the masses of the people and which has been refined and has gained scope from 1946 to this day, must be taken into consideration when striving for a conformity of views among the various parties, without putting any pressures on the standards of democracy.

We do not believe that hanging our hopes on the success of a single party and adopting a /"pessimistic"/ approach towards any possibilities outside of it, which would shatter the 12 September, can lead to sound and permanent results.

The Turkish Armed Forces are a sufficiently experienced and progressive institution to be able to unite and lead the 500,000 citizens it keeps under arms, to fight for the same goals in the defense of the nation beyond /"all convictions."/
(A great many progressive countries do not have that potential).

Why should this achievement not be taken as a model for tomorrow's civilian policies? Why should rational and democratic measures, which will increase the least common denominators and intensify conformity of views on such points, not be sufficient?

Why not trust the nation which gained bitter experience before the 12 September, on this issue?

Those who successfully planned a complex procedure that will ensure the rise of General Ersin to the position of Chief of General Staff, and that of the valuable commanders who await their turn for the posts they deserve, with the valuable experience they gained have the wisdom to make sound decisions in the transition to civilian life, through choices that will not offend the people's sense of fairness and will compel friends and enemies alike to say /"That is democracy, my friend."/

Provided the thesis that /"one cannot trust those civilians"/ which is ceaseless-ly harped on by /"civilians"/ who wish to get into politics, at the expense of the Armed Forces, does not gain ground, that no hesitation is shown because of such insinuations.

12278

CSO: 3554/360

POLITICAL TURKEY

SOYSAL ARGUES FOR MDP-ANAP COALITION APPROACH

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 29 Jun 83 p 2

["Viewpoint" column by Mumtaz Soysal: "Balance"]

[Text] At first sight Turkey's political arena may look very confusing.

But if one looks more carefully, one finds in there a surprising clarity. Issues that used to be unclear in minds have now gained finality:

- 1. The new Constitution has made the President, with his first election and permanent powers, the keystone of the new government system. However, as in the case of the Fifth French Republic, the extent to which the President will be able to play this role will depend on the presence of a prime minister who will have the support of a parliamentary majority which will not oppose the President's policies. Having such a majority and finding such a prime minister has become the primary condition for the transition to the system envisioned by the new Constitution.
- 2. The issue of insistence on whether the new parties should not be the continuation of old ones has begun to be considered important not only from a perspective of the danger of a return to the pre-12 September period, but also from a viewpoint of whether the President can have a government which will work harmoniously with him. It is a definite fact that no one wants the parties which are accused of "having brought the country to the pre-12 September period" to win a majority in the parliament, even though that may run counter to rules of political realism.
- 3. The Nationalist Democracy Party [MDP], which has been set up with the intention of forming a government in compliance with the new Constitution, does not appear to be in a position to win such a majority.

This picture needs to be completed with two more lines coming from the depths of history and not from the events of the last few years:

1. Turkey must return to an electoral, parliamentary and multiparty system as soon as possible, even if there will be conditions and restrictions which are hard to be reconciled with the basic principles of democracy. Because a country cannot remain for long outside the carse of democratic development it has plotted

for itself for at least one and a half centuries. Because it is the nation's common desire to prevent the army from getting damaged by remaining in the government directly for longer periods of time. Because international conditions necessitate the presence of an army which focuses its attention on its own training and strength and which oversees the administration of the country only indirectly.

2. A "one-party ideology" which proposes definite solutions for the country's problems and which may be considered as the first condition of a "one-party government" which will be bonded to and supported by the army and which will be the army's civilian extension has not yet been developed. In any event, Turkey's problems are not the kind that can be solved by such final recipes in a single generation. What is important is keeping alive the hope that various solutions can be tried according to the conditions of different times and environments with a perspective spread over several generations.

This being the case, today's anguish can be resolved by asking the following question which is based on weighing two major alternatives: Is it more objectionable, from a perspective of trends coming from the depths of history, to return to an electoral, parliamentary and multiparty system even if there are restrictions or to postpone this transition because the government required by the new system cannot be formed even with the restrictions?

Since the greater majority and, in particular, those who would most object to the restrictions would prefer starting a new period over a stagnancy whose results are unknown, efforts from now on must concentrate on forming the government required by the new system by legitimate means which would not violate the fundamental principles of democracy too pointedly. This can only be done by reforming the MDP, which has been having development problems, under a new leadership so that it can at least exceed the electoral threshold and thinking about a pre-election or postelection coalition between the MDP and the Motherland Party [ANAP], which has developed itself fairly solidly without contravening the political and economic philosophy of 12 September.

9588

CSO: 3554/359

POLITICAL TURKEY

MAJOR SHAKEUP IN LEADERSHIP OF SODEP

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 28 Jun 83 pp 1,10

[Text] Ankara--The 21 new founding members of the Social Democracy Party [SODEP] were elected at the party's Founders' Council meeting yesterday.

The new founding members of SODEP are:

"Dr Akbulut Alakan, Ankara's former director general of health; Yasar Alicli, publishing house owner; Dr Orhan Asena, playwright; Selahattin Canbay, retired criminal court president; Nail Gureli, former president of the Turkish Journalists' Union; Ferruh Guven, retired governor and a member of the Founding Assembly of 1961; Ismail Inan, former leader of the Turkish Confederation of Labor; Dogan Konelli, jurist and businessmen; Professor Baki Kuru, jurist; Ustun Kosefoglu, educator and president of the 19 May University Fund; Dogan Okdemir, veterinarian and a former member of the Higher Auditing Council of the Prime Minister's Office; Ogun Oner, pharmacist; Haydar Ozkin, former security chief and retired governor; Cetin Soyak, former deputy leader of the Turkish War Industry and Allied Workers Unions Federation; Dr Ziya Tinel, laryngologist; Haluk Turksoy, industrialist; Ertugrul Unluer, retired governor; Vahit Yilmaz, educator; Ekrem Yurdakos, former member of the Supreme Court of Appeals; Cetin Remzi Yuregir, owner of the daily YENI ADANA; Ismail Hakki Zarakol, senior engineer."

The names of the new founding members elected yesterday to replace SODEP's vetoed founding members were submitted to the Ministry of the Interior.

SODEP Deputy Leader Cezmi Kartay and Ahmet Durakoglu went to the Ministry of the Interior yesterday and submitted the names of the new founding members together with the necessary documents to the Secretary General of the ministry.

Cezmi Kartay Elected Leader of SODEP

At SODEP's Founders' Council meeting which began at 5:30 pm yesterday, former governor Cezmi Kartay was elected as the second leader of the party.

At the opening of the meeting, deputy leader Cezmi Kartay, Secretary General Ahmet Durakoglu, Deputy Secretary General Oktay Eksi and other party organ officers who had not been vetoed announced that they were resigning their posts.

Upon that, elections were held. Kartay won 34 of the votes of the 36 founding members attending the meeting and was elected as SODEP's second leader, replacing Erdal Inonu, who has been vetoed. Ahmet Durakoglu won one vote, and there was one abstention.

Later, the SODEP Founders' Council elected a new secretary general and the 21 members of the Central Decision and Administration Council.

Mehmet Kiciman, Oktay Eksi, Refet Tuzun and Kemal Sarisoy were elected as deputy leaders of SODEP.

Ahmet Durakoglu was reelected as Secretary General of SODEP.

The SODEP Founders' Council also elected the members of the Central Decision and Administration Council.

Members elected to the Central Decision and Administration Council by the previous Founders' Council resigned their posts in order to allow the election to be held among all party members.

The following members were elected to the Central Decision and Administration Council:

Ahmet Durakoglu, Oktay Eksi, Refet Tuzun, Gunduz Pamuk, Hudai Oral, Kemal Sarisoy, Mehmet Kiciman, Baki Kuru, Ismail Inan, Orhan Asena, Ugur Batmaz, Ekrem Yurdakos, Ahmet Salih Cebi, Cetin Soyak, Metin Sahin, Dogan Okdemir, Seyfi Turagay, Ertugrul Unluer, Selahattin Canbay and Vahit Yilmaz.

Disciplinary Council Members

Later, the members of the party's Central Disciplinary Council were elected.

Akbulut Alatan, Yasar Alisli, Ferruh Guven, Ustun Kusefoglu, Suleyman Sarialioglu, Ziya Cinel and Ismail Hakki Zarakol were elected to the Central Disciplinary Council.

Who is Cezmi Kartay?

Cezmi Kartay, the new SODEP leader, was born in Izmit in 1920. Kartay went to elementary and middle school in Istanbul and after graduating from the Faculty of Political Sciences he started working as a government aide.

After working as a district head and a property auditor, Kartay served as the governor of Malatya between 1960 and 1966. Kartay also concurrently served as the mayor of Malatya for 3½ years during this period.

After being recalled to Ankara in 1966, Kartay was later named as the governor of Tekirdag. After being recalled to Ankara again, he served as the governor of Gaziantep between 1977 and 1980. In March 1980, Kartay retired voluntarily and became the Secretary General of Ankara's Stock Exchange. He retired from this job when he started working on founding SODEP. Kartay speaks German, is married and has three daughters.

9588

CSO: 3554/359

POLITICAL

SODEP ORGANIZATIONAL WORK IN SOUTHERN AREAS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 5 Jul 83 p 7

[Text] Adana--The Social Democracy Party [SODEP] has begun working on setting up its Adana provincial organization.

SODEP founders Mehmet Kiciman and Baki Kuru have arrived in Adana and are continuing their work in the Abidinpasa Avenue office of journalist Cetim Remzi Yuregir, who is also a founding member of SODEP.

SODEP leaders Kiciman and Kuru, who will also set up the party's provincial organizations in Icel and Hatay in addition to that of Adana, told our correspondent:

"Here we are trying to come up with a list of names. We will submit those names to the Founders' Council in Ankara as a proposal. After the Founders' Council completes its evaluation, the provincial organization will have been established.

"We found great interest for our party in Adana. We find that very pleasing. We are meeting with colleagues from various professional groups. A large number of friends have been coming to us and expressing their views. We are summarizing those views. At the moment we are concentrating on certain individuals and gathering information.

"The names that we have compiled and will compile in Adana will be sent to Ankara tomorrow (today). We will conclude our work in Adana this evening. Then we will go on to Mersin. We will hold contacts in Mersin and we will gather names for our party's provincial organization there. We think that we will be in Hatay on Wednesday. We will conclude our work in Hatay as soon as possible and return to Ankara. The names gathered from these three provinces will be considered at the Founders' Council meeting to be held on Thursday, and we hope that the results of the meeting will be announced before the end of the week."

Noting that the names of individuals who have wanted to become party provincial leaders or members of the provincial executive councils are being kept secret for the moment, Kiciman and Kuru said: "Announcing names at this time may have drawbacks for these friends of ours."

Cetin Remzi Yuregir began his work yesterday in connection with forming the SODEP provincial organization in Gaziantep. It is reported that SODEP founding member Yuregir had talks with a large number of individuals in Gaziantep yesterday.

SODEP's Eskisehir provincial organization will open today. SODEP leader Cezmi Kartay will be present at the opening. Retired senior forestry engineer Cemal Metin has been appointed as the party's provincial leader for Eskisehir.

Former Eskisehir Mayor Selami Vardar congratulated the members of SODEP's Eskisehir Provincial Executive Council. Vardar said: "Democracy is a system of compromises. I congratulate the elected colleagues and wish them success."

9588

CSO: 3554/365

POLITICAL TURKEY

#### ANAP LEADER OZAL HOLDS NEWS CONFERENCE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 5 Jul 83 p 7

[Text] Motherland Party [ANAP] leader Turgut Ozal said at a press conference he held at his party's Istanbul provincial headquarters yesterday: "We are the fastest organizing party. We have completed our organization in 18 provinces. By the holidays, we will have set up 22 more provincial organizations."

Expressing his views on economic issues, Ozal reiterated that he does "not take seriously" Minister of Finance Adnan Baser Kafaoglu's recent statements on the 24 January decisions and said that the inflation rate cannot be held down to 20 percent with today's policies. In response to a journalist's question on what errors there are in current policies, Ozal said: "If you throw money into a bottomless pit, the money will not come back. Rescuing firms and banks means throwing money into a bottomless pit."

Yesterday, Ozal opened his party's district organizations in Zeytinburnu, Eyup, Gaziosmanpasa and Beyoglu.

Ozal stated that ANAP has so far organized itself in 18 provinces, that organization in these provinces has not been the mere appointment of provincial party leaders and that the organizations were opened only after the provincial executive and disciplinary councils were formed and party buildings and the necessary equipment and materials were procured. Ozal said that party provincial organizations will be opened before the holidays in Kahramanmaras, Kayseri, Kirsehir, Ordu, Giresun, Samsun, Adana, Icel, Hatay, Erzincan, Eskisehir, Kutahya, Mus, Urfa, Adiyaman, Nevsehir, Corum, Bingol, Cankiri, Bilecik, Kocaeli and Aydin.

Stating that his party will have organized in all 67 provinces by the end of July, Ozal said that he travelled 10,000 kilometers in a week to open party provincial organizations and that he will travel 50,000 to 60,000 kilometers until the elections and try to stop in all 67 provinces.

Stating that people who used to vote for the four defunct parties have been joining ANAP as members, Ozal explained that his party is largely made up of young and dynamic cadres.

Speaking about economic issues, Ozal said about Minister of Finance Kafaoglu's recent statements about the 24 January decisions: "I am not taking them seriously."

Claiming that his party is "the only genuine friend of low and middle-income groups", Ozal said: "We are the ones who protect most the worker, the public servant, the farmer and the small businessman. Because we see inflation as the number one enemy." Ozal continued:

"In the last three years we did our best to halt price increases, that is inflation, in order to improve the state of the poor. However, there is a minority in this country that wants inflation to rise. These are the stockpilers and black marketeers who have got used to windfall profits in an inflationary atmosphere and who dream of becoming millionaires overnight."

Stating that the rate of inflation cannot be held down to 20 percent with the present course, Ozal said in reply to a question on why it could not be done:

"Money must be used for the right purpose. If it is used for the wrong purpose, inflation will not decrease; it will increase. If you throw money into a bottomless pit, the money will not come back. Rescuing firms and banks means throwing money into a bottomless pit. Money must be used for purposes which will bring the money back."

# District Organizations

After the press conference, Ozal went to attend the opening of four party district offices in the prevince of Istanbul. The following individuals were named party district leaders in the four ANAP district organizations opened yesterday: Sadi Abbasoglu for Zeytinburnu, Eyup Ucar for Eyup, Galip Aksoy for Gaziosmanpasa and Altan Kavak for Beyoglu.

Ozal, who held a Ramadan dinner for the party's Istanbul provincial administrators and the press corps in Pera Palas Hotel in the evening, stated that he will go to Adana on Wednesday to oversee the party's organizational efforts in the area.

9588 CSO: 3554/365 MILITARY

### MINISTER TO CONSIDER CHANGES IN CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Jul 83 p 5

[Article by Dan Axel: "Social Democrat-Conservative Conflict on Conscription"]

[Text] Defense Minister Hans Engell is very dissatisfied with social democratic defense spokesman Knud Damgaard, who implied in the newspaper FAGLIGT FORSVAR that the government wants to cut down on regular defense personnel—to get more conscripts.

"It is absurd to use my statements as a possible expansion of conscription in this way," said Hans Engell to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. "I merely openly said that in connection with the preparation of discussions of a new defense plan after 1984, we should consider whether the number of conscripts should be expanded."

The defense minister is concerned that the average age in the Danish mobilization forces in the long term will be too high. "Therefore we should openly investigate what the consequences of expanded conscription—both in numbers and perhaps also in length of service—would be economically and in terms of training for the defense forces," said Hans Engell.

"In addition to that it is obvious that I believe that defense conditions can be strengthened in that way," said Hans Engell. "The defense is not just something that we pay for—but something that we must to a large extent participate in."

Knud Damgaard (Social Democrat) wrote the other day in FAGLIG FORSVAR that it will be necessary to cut down the numbers of regular personnel in the defense forces and raise conscript time by 5 months if there are to be more conscripts in the defense forces.

It is the belief of the Social Democrats that the future defense forces will consist of "total defense forces which will be able to resist invasion forces and stop violations of sovereignty." Knud Damgaard said, "I also

believe that a total defense can be used more in peacetime, for example in natural disasters, than can be done at the moment. I, like others, have been surprised that we have not used the Engineer Corps in connection with chemical pollution, because that corps has a lot of expertise in that field."

9287

CSO: 3613/146

MILITARY

COLONEL'S ARTICLE ON WEAKNESSES IN DEFENSE BRINGS REACTIONS

Morale, Discipline, Readiness Problems

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Jul 83 p 7

[Article by Colonel C. F. Hagen: "Serving Colonel Speaks His Mind"]

[Text] It has been interesting—although a little disappointing—to see the reactions to my feature article, "Poor Defense in the Eighties." They were few.

From Vordingbord the constables' combined representative has presented a criticism which says that I want to sabotage cooperation and cause antipathy toward the constables. His legitimate right to express himself will not be contested. It is important to see his comments in the correct perspective:

"He has chosen to present the narrow interests of a specific personnel group, which are not necessarily synonymous with those of the defense. He does not represent any military expertise."

Although I can feel some antipathy for the form of argument used, the statement gives me the opportunity to get to the bottom of some essential conditions.

On training: It is of course only to a small extent the fault of individual constables that in recent years we have performed poorly in NATO competition (and we do not belong, as claimed, to the elite). Or that the constables results in a recently conducted firing competition averaged markedly below that of the conscripts. Many of our constables made a good contribution, some even more. But the examples emphasize the cold facts: Longer vacations, civilian education and compensatory time off seldom give sufficient time and continuity to the training. Reduced officer standards which tend especially to reduce active duty, are forcing frequent shifts in key personnel of the units, leading to further discontinuity. An extensive bureaucracy steals manpower. Civilian instructors are shocked at being

required to work under these conditions. We are trying all this in the army. That we only reach a professional standard is not surprising.

On discipline and morale: Good cooperation is—and has always been—an important element in the morale of military units. Whether the cooperative arrangement is appropriate is on the other hand subject to discussion. Its structure and formulation in a special hierarchy means, among other things, significant pressure on scanty resources for meetings, courses, etc. As in other hierarchies there are signs here also that people are affected by the law of self-centering. The primary goal, effectiveness of the defense forces, is lost sight of. Currently illustrated by the assumption that cooperation is threatened because I allow an attacker to estimate our situation. Discussions of pay and fringe benefits in a cooperation committee hardly contribute to building up reliable morale, in other words a morale which will withstand the enormous burdens of war.

The defense is not a state within a state. Neither can one in practice bring daily service into agreement with wartime conditions. But the aim must still be kept in sight, that the ultimate requirement that defense personnel must be able to live up to, basically creates different conditions than in the civilian society. Therefore acceptance of authority and the duty of clear obedience is fundamental from the general to the youngest private. And therefore the conditions of service under which we work must reflect special consideration, daily zest and adherence to the objective of the whole. Both the cooperative arrangement and the slogan "The Army as a Workplace" contribute to crowding out the purpose. A minimum demand must be that every step which is taken during peacetime is judged in the light of the existence of the defense. How often does that happen today?

With these comments I have also covered some of the points which the defense minister touched upon in his speech. I will merely add that only the minister can give—cost free, after all—a contribution to the effectiveness and reliability of the defense. He can do that by bringing about a change in attitude of those who shape the conditions of service, and by making inquiries about the influence of conditions on realistic training, discipline and wartime morale. Especially with officers on active duty. My training report for 1982 is recommended for his closer study.

The minister's speech uses the estimate of the intelligence service as a starting point: The probability of a limited attack against the Denmark area does not at this time seem great.

This is perhaps the place to emphasize the difference between probability and possibility. In that connection the concept of probability is somewhat speculative—something that we ourselves make up. But there is a clear risk of human misjudgment of an opponent, whose real intentions we never can have reasonably certain knowledge of. And with that perspective,

dispositions on the basis of probability in a given case can lead to national catastrophe. One should therefore primarily base his decisions on the factual and real possibilities from which an aggressor can choose. That gives a realistic basis to the security debate.

It was recently stated that our personnel readiness is flexible, that the navy and air force peacetime readiness is relatively high. But which measuring stick is used for that judgment? That level of preparedness only has meaning if it is seen in relation to our purpose. In view of my description of a coup situation one can hardly claim that preparedness is satisfactory, which the minister did not do either.

We can now confirm that the threat has been growing for a long time, and that the tactical warning of a surprise attack is negligible. In the same period the preparedness of the defense has been subject to continuous reductions. The logic is missing.

In the material area, procurements are mentioned which should improve the situation in the coming years. Army officers, however, have developed a solid skepticism from experience. Many of the ongoing procurements have already appeared in previous plans, but year after year have been rejected. If a miracle should nonetheless happen, it must be remembered that procurement often takes a long time. For example, gas protective devices will take until 1989 to obtain. First though, we need arms which will make it possible for us to fight effectively under the conditions which the aggressor can force upon us today. It is being demonstrated in Afghanistan that he is not moving backward.

Certain passages in the minister's speech could leave the impression that my feature article represented a despairing position. He does not give examples of that, but let me, for the sake of completeness, make my position clear: There must be a simple obligation for every soldier, regardless of his rank, to make maximum use of the means under his control to perform his duties. If it should come to it, to use his utmost ability to fight an aggressor who sets foot on Danish soil. Even if his means of fighting are meager.

My argument has another purpose: An individual citizen who wants to buy a new tool, has the choice between one that costs 1000 kroner and one that costs 1250 kroner. The cheap one will look nice, but everyone knows that it is not able to do much. On the other hand the 1250 model can do the complete job. Would anybody in his right mind choose the 1000 kroner model?

I urge realistic awareness of the conditions being offered to the units of the army.

I can not reconcile this awareness with assurances that are being given to the people by the officials. It is therefore that I find it so important

to report how the picture looks from the ranks. After a catastrophe the survivors will be justified in accusing the officers, if they keep their information silent.

I must therefore also conclude by deploring the fact that the minister's speech overlooks the central and decisive problem, namely the reliability of the forces as seen through the eyes of an aggressor. With a positive attitude toward an effective defense, which the minister has otherwise demonstrated, it was my secret hope that the feature article would have given him modest support in his endeavors.

Economy Seen Setting Restraints

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Jul 83 p 9

[Article by Svend-Erik Larsen, chairman of the Association of Army Privates and Corporals: "The Defense Must Lower Its Ambition Level"]

[Text] Colonel C. F. Hagen's feature article "Poor Defense in the Eighties" on 8 June was intended as an appeal to that part of the population which does not sympathize with the peace movement.

In spite of the colonel's capably staged "play" in which the commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact and his head of intelligence discuss the Danish ground defenses, the feature article bears the stamp of Colonel Hagen being basically misinformed on a number of the political intentions, agreements and conditions which form the basis of the Danish Army's activities in peace and war.

In his indirect answer to Lance Corporal Klaus D. Dreschler, Vordingborg, here in this newspaper on 1 July, Colonel C. F. Hagen is looking for reactions to his feature article. Herewith is my contribution, and I will try to keep myself in the world of reality.

When we discuss conditions in the defense forces, we should realize that in each one of the scheduled 4-year periods the Folketing appropriates about 40 billion kroner for the defense, an amount which the highest officers in the defense forces have great influence in spending. We must simply state again that the society finds itself in an economic crisis, where it is not only the defense which must hold back, but the entire public sector. Things are now such that it is through taxes that we get appropriations for defense, and fortunately for many years there has been a solid political majority in the Folketing behind the defense appropriations.

With the introduction of the constable arrangement [a system whereby young persons with special education of training provide paid service over a number of years in the defense forces] in Denmark, the army gets a volunteer

soldier who serves at least 2 years and 9 months. During this period there is no absence for reasons of civilian education. The constables do not have a right to education in the first part of the contract period (even if the commander of the brigade believes he does). Therefore it is assumed that the army will in reality use those 33 months for real military training.

The problem with the constable arrangement is that the arrangement never really was accepted by most of the army's commanders, even though the then chief of the army worked out the training plans for 33 months and arranged the working time therefor. That paradox has, unfortunately, had the following results:

- The army did not arrange a training program for the constables, a training program which should begin the day he/she arrives and end the day he/she meets his/her professional level. But the army continues to be indifferent to the repetition of his/her basic training. That naturally creates an enormous waste of resources.
- Although the number of expensive field maneuvers has been justified in recent years, the maneuver rhythm hardly satisfies the individual soldier's need for training. Considering that command staffs can be well-trained in other ways (simulators, etc.) that causes a waste of resources.
- There is an inappropriate mixture in the units of young constables without the right of civilian education and older ones who long ago should have been finished with basic and functional military training and who have the right to civilian education.
- Senior officers of the army often "forget" to inform personnel that working time is the same for the constable as for all other state employees, also that the leaders can largely shuffle the working hours around at their pleasure, and eliminate the effects of the regulations when it suits them. That creates uncertainty as to the real conditions. The purpose of fixed working hours for the constable group, among others, is to force the leadership to plan, which—if the education goals are met—is the only possible quality control in an area where it is not produced. I wonder if irritation about the working hours regulations is a dislike of that control?
- Commanders and leaders have "forgotten" that the former "commanding general" (now inspector of the army) and the chief of defense recognized that the agreed work standard and training time is more than adequate to reach the training goals. With the establishment of the constable program in the army it became necessary to include a right of civilian education, not only so that the constable could go home with a useful civilian education, but also because there simply is no need to continue military training after the professional level is reached.

- The civilian education arrangement—which is offered to the individual constable—is far from being effectively utilized. With the establishment of the arrangement the chief of the army reported that when the constable had reached the first training level he could use 65 percent of his time for civilian education.

During the last two agreement negotiations that we have had with the defense minister, the defense command representatives clearly stated that the goal of the constable arrangement is to retain the constables for at least 4 years.

In the Defense Plan of 1973 the time of service was set for conscripted privates at 9 months. The politicians' precondition for that decision was that a pedagogically effective training environment should be established. But the army put their least qualified instructors into the training. Another precondition was that there would be recalls of enlisted men as well as officers, but the army used the money for something else.

It was decided that we would focus on the length of service, and decide according to the functions to be performed by individuals on mobilization. For some positions, time of service could presumably be reduced.

It is a fact that mobilization strength is not fully up to the mark. Therefore it is—and has furthermore always been—the political intention that the strong and well—trained constable force of 7,500 men should act as the backbone of the army's combat units.

By more effective management of the army's training activity, resources could be released—not just for survival equipment—but also for improvement of the depots for the mobilization forces. So there are some things that the army itself can do something about.

Of course we have certain material problems in the army, but I must state my agreement with Defense Minister Hans Engell when he wrote in this paper on the 14th that we have much modern and useful material, and the coming years' procurement will put us in a much better situation than we are in today.

The colonel should have spared us the speech by the "Warsaw Pact intelligence officer" (or perhaps by himself) about the loyalty of the Danish officer corps, in any case unless it was to be seen as a "contrast with others."

The group that I represent, and the colleagues that I cooperate with daily, stand 100 percent at all times behind the present Danish government. It is of course not a part-time job that we are doing here, but jobs for many thousands and their families, who obviously put their confidence in having a secure—and for many—also an enduring tenure. I know what the colonel's

own union also stands for, and therefore it is not unnatural that other personnel groups are fighting for the same things.

Constables and moncommissioned officers have on several occasions, in competition with personnel from other NATO countries and during pollution and catastrophe situations, shown great generosity and loyalty. And they naturally also want to be in place to defend our freedom, our society and our loved ones. The colonel should never be in doubt about that.

I agree with Colonel C. F. Hagen that the population needs factual information before they appropriate tax money to fill out the framework in a coming defense bill. But I do not believe that it is possible to convince the country's taxpayers that we should have a mini-edition of superpower defense.

In the material area I agree with the chief of defense, General Knud Jorgensen, who at the opening of the War College last year said that during the rest of this century we must reduce our ambition level, and to make our procurement less expensive we must continue to standardize. We must try to have Danish solutions, because they are usually cheaper. That means that sometimes we can squeeze by following the NATO standard, because we can not afford the more sophisticated.

When one is poor he is forced to find cheaper solutions, which prove to be just as good, said the chief of defense that day in Oksbol.

We have clever commanders and leaders in the defense, who will be able to find the best solutions, and to whom our members can securely hand over their fate, in case the day must come, but all should also know that in case centrally placed officers express themselves, they should be correct, and there must not be any doubt that it is the Folketing which decides what we will do, and how much resources we will have for solving the problems.

If there is the least doubt about that, I must--very reluctantly--inform the colonel's colleague in Farum, the chief of the Zealand Engineer Regiment, that commanders in the armed forces should refrain from any form of political activity.

### Home Guard Problems Discussed

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 July 83 p 7

[Article by Tapio Juhl, home guard consultant: "Another Picture of the Home Guard"]

[Text] Wednesday, 29 June 1983, M. H. Spies, principal, LLB and private in the home guard had an article here in the paper in which he made himself the spokesman for abolishing the civilian part of the home guard. Furthermore the article contained an unreasonably severe attack against home guard

consultant and editor of HJEMMEVAERNSBLADET, Knud Damgaard, who was appointed home guard commissioner while Poul Sogaard was defense minister.

Now Knud Damgaard can undoubtedly speak for himself. And M. H. Spies will perhaps argue that as I am a home guard consultant I of course will answer to defend my job and fairly good salary.

I really do not think that I can impose upon M. H. Spies any other belief than he expressed in his articles. He also has the right to express that opinion—naturally! But the readers perhaps get the impression that many home guard people believe like M. H. Spies, and that he speaks on behalf of the home guard.

Obviously that is not true!

There is no open break (nor, I believe, a barrier) between the "civilian and military" parts of the home guard. There is no party-political misuse of HJEMMEVAERNSBLADET. There is no sign of open revolt. There is not going to be an association of volunteer officers—"turned against social democratic control of the home guard." There will not be a Radio Council arrangement for the home guard. No mass resignations are taking place in the home guard (on the contrary!). There are no political deliberations in progress about abolishing the position of commissioner for the home guard. There are no plans to abolish the "civilian part" of the home guard (or the military part either).

Just as M. H. Spies can not speak on behalf of the home guard, neither can I do that, but there is this difference between his and my background for opinions, that I meet volunteer home guard people around the entire country. Partly as a teacher at our courses at the home guard school in Nymindegab and Slipshavn, and partly at meetings for other purposes around the country. M. H. Spies hardly has the background for his arguments. And I must again emphasize that what M. H. Spies has so bombastically expressed in his article in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE hardly agrees with the impressions that I have gathered around the country.

But it is correct that defense and security policy have become more ambiguous. And when one carefully studies the opinion polls brought out by various institutes, one can hardly argue that it is the fault of the Social Democrats! I could also wish that we had a very strong defense, and that the home guard could have all the things that it needs. But at the same time I must recognize that the parliamentary foundation is as it is—and that it rests on the opinions and attitudes of the country's citizens!

It is also correct that in the home guard we have discussions about our home guard, our defense and security policies. It is also correct that the debates have become more frequent and sharper. Yes, fortunately! For without exchanges of opinion there is no life and no democracy! Churchill

had a saying, "peace through understanding." That applies in relation to events near and far. It is true in face-to-face discussions in the home guard. It is true in discussions in larger forums, at our community courses at the home guard school in Nymindegab and at other courses that the home guard conducts for home guard people and civilian participants around the country.

Also in the circles of home guard consultants, where different political attitudes exist, they are debated at the monthly meetings with the commissioner for the home guard. It has always been this way. There can be short words and large differences of opinion. But even if the majority of home guard consultants mostly come from the "nonsocialist wing" I can say that we mostly agree on the policy which has brought about the home guard!

The home guard will continue to be a people's movement in the correct meaning of the word. We will also ensure that the home guard represents all of the people, in terms of age, occupation and political adherence! A Conservative, a Social Democrat and a Left-Socialist are all equally welcome, when they are volunteer members of the home guard, demonstrating their willingness to defend peace and freedom! And in that connection, I really believe that the demonstration of willingness is of great importance. And that which we continuously strive to maintain throughout the home guard is of greater importance than the purchase of other weapons for fighting helicopters, which M. H. Spies recommends in his article. For if there is no popular will or popular spirit behind the defense, and especially in the home guard, it does not help to have gunpowder and ball by the bucketfull. And a home guard is then without meaning—we might as well abolish it today!

That is the responsibility of the home guard consultant. That is the responsibility of the home guard leadership. A home guard leadership of a general and a commissioner, where they both are responsible to the defense minister for the home guard's total activities. M. H. Spies has entirely forgotten that.

"And that is also the home guard's responsibility. It is the only thing that can ensure a home guard in Denmark today and in the future."

I am also not satisfied with the expression which M. H. Spies came out with, which is far from the truth in the home guard—from Husby Dunes to Valby Hill. It disturbs me that M. H. Spies expresses an attitude which is more frequently being seen, particularly in the east, as I move about the kingdom. A desire to a greater extent to "be like the real defense forces!" And in that way we could abolish the voluntary home guard. That would be a self-contradiction.

In the comment on the home guard law it states, "The home guard will support the three branches of the armed forces and strengthen the power of the population to resist" (defense willingness). Of course there should be powder and ball available, but if we have nothing to defend, and do not know what we are defending, namely the right to carry on free discussions, it is not worth so much military hardware. Think about Finland, Afghanistan, Vietnam.

In the 5 years that I have been a home guard consultant, I have heard of one (1) resignation, because he was unhappy over the Social Democrats' defense and security policy. But I see that people are joining the home guard in large numbers, and before the end of the year we will be 80,000!

Now here M. H. Spies could justly criticize us. Are we able to receive all these new young people? Can we retain them, so that they will not leave the home guard too rapidly? If they do I will have to answer to M. H. Spies. That worries me!

Some time ago I sat in the canteen at the home guard school and watched two soldiers paying for the food that they had received. The first was an American soldier who had participated together with others in a large NATO exercise. He was in a neatly pressed uniform without anything sewn on the uniform other than a patch over the breast pocket: U. S. Marines. The other was a home guard man on a training course. He had many badges and labels sewn on his uniform. An enormous sheath knife was tied to his thigh. On his breast pocket were sewn a bunch of safety pins from hand grenades. Another sheath knife was stuck down in the wide belt. The pockets bulged—was it from knuckledusters or rocks?

That was the people's spirit.

That worries me.

And was that really worth a discussion?

Defense Will, Readiness

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Jul 83 p 11

[Article by Jorgen Riise, director, former line officer, now triario: "Repetition Coming..."]

[Text] Colonel C. F. Hagen described in his feature article "Poor Defense in the Eighties" how a conversation between the commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact forces and his intelligence chief, talking about Denmark and Denmark's defense forces, could go. In an objective and factually well-based way the colonel disclosed our potential opponent's well-developed military system and absolutely competent leadership system—and obviously theirby the catastrophic shortages of the Danish defense, material and morale.

The feature article called on our responsible politicians to inform the population about the situation, and not continue the present practice of hiding the data behind a smokescreen.

The intelligence chief in the East considered the situation, from an enthusiastic and idealistic officers corps to a group of paperpushing defense functuaries, as an especially favorable development—and nobody can contest that impression, even though the intelligence chief perhaps generalized too much.

The same week TV broadcast a program about the Slevigske Foot Regiment, and the broadcast—perhaps involuntarily—illustrated the judgment of the intelligence chief. The chief of defense spoke of "The Army as a Workplace" and the resulting personnel and garrison problems. And the regimental commander had the opportunity to tell about the regiment's history, traditions and collection of antiquities—and of the different functions he was expected to carry out in peacetime and in war. He did not use the word war, but different gentler, softer and more padded terminology.

Nobody said that we lack the means "in a given situation" to put the army in shape to accomplish its tasks: to defend our democracy and the way of life we have chosen. Nobody said anything about the politicians allowing this.

A veteran from 9 April was brought forth and told about his and his comrades' heroic and meaningless fight behind their 37 mm machine cannon, which was taken from a museum for the occasion—scarred but in smart condition.

Heroic, because despite the weakness of the politicians, they carried out their duties for themselves, their regiment and their country. Meaningless fight, because the previous years' political decisions on the defense had compromised all possibilities. And the political and moral decay was paid for with pain and death that April morning in 1940, when half-trained soldiers were ordered into battle against the best equipped, best trained and best organized military power of that time.

It looks as though a repetition of that show is on the way. Colonel C. F. Hagen commented last Friday on the reactions to his feature article, amplified a number of problem situations, and confirmed his deep disappointment over the outcome.

One of the army's many personnel organizations used the opportunity to advance narrow trade union interests, and showed little or no understanding of the realities of the decay of the army.

Apparently they did not understand what the mission of the army is—and as an unpleasant consequence of that, did not understand that each shortage in the army will increase the number killed.

The defense minister expressed himself in vague terms, but explained his positive attitude toward defense. But even the most positive attitude is little help when our soldiers are standing at the wrong end of eastern rigles and cannons.

A couple of letters from readers commended the colonel for his initiative, but otherwise silence—deep silence—other than comments on the 10 billion kroner spent for an insufficient and therefore ineffective defense.

Outsiders must with puzzlement confirm that training in the army is decided by bureaucratic quibbling, vacations and compensatory time off, civilian education and other less appropriate and irrelevant activities.

Discipline and morale is compromised by social gatherings and environments under the name of "meetings" having more to do with pay and benefits than the primary mission: how we can best equip and train the army to fulfill its role in peacetime and war.

The Folketing has decided that the country will be defended. The Folketing has the legal right—through the government—to send soldiers out to defend the country, and if necessary die. Does not the Folketing thereby also have a moral and perhaps also legal duty to suffer the consequences of these decisions?

The consequences are to ensure the defense, especially now the army, the best possible weapons, the best possible material and the best possible training. If the Folketing fails to fulfill these requirements, we will come considerably closer to concepts such as "suicide orders"—not to mention direct murder or murder by proxy.

The late Colonel Halvor Jessen wrote in his book "Hvorfor har forsvarsviljen forladt det danske folk" [Why Did Defense Will Abandon the Danish People] (1942)that during the winter 1939/40 he was on alert with the 1st and 15th battalions, in which all antitank weapons were marked with "4 yellow flags."

Ten years ago it was explained to a couple of Swiss officers on a study visit during a NATO exercise on Zealand, that the participating Centurion tanks were not intended to be a "historical input" in the exercise, although they were...

The Centurion tanks are still serving on Zealand.

Our amoral defense policies could not bluff foreign powers in 1940. The credibility of our defense is judged to be just as low by our friends as by our potential enemies.

The ancient Romans positioned their army in three ranks, and the rear rank was the triarios, the oldest men. When things went badly for the Romans,

and the first and second ranks had to give up, the cry was, "Jam ad triarios venit res"--now the third rank must win the victory.

There is no possibility for second or third ranks today. The first rank must take the entire thrust, and must therefore be equipped and trained in agreement with this concept.

The white heads at the Army Officers School in the 50's had a little more rough translation of the ancient Roman emergency cry: "We're going to hell with..." or "We are on our backsides with..."

Politicians must be put together differently than other people. Gailbraith believes that they will die twice--once just before the verbose and ceremonial obituary--the second time a little earlier, when they lose an election. Others believe that they all want to go to heaven, but none of them wants to die.

Gailbraith also believes that old soldiers do not die, they fade away and disappear. But politicians can order them to die.

Give them a chance, however, to fade away and disappear--material, training and realistic working conditions.

If we do not want to do that, then save the many billions and hand over the guard to a corps of watchmen, and let the tourist associations receive the potential enemies. That would be honorable, in any case, and then the politicians would not need to have moral scruples.

9287

CSO: 3613/146

MILITARY FRANCE

DEFENSE STRATEGY ANALYZED BASED ON STRATEGIC, TACTICAL FORCES

Paris DEFENSE in French Mar 83 pp 41-44

[Article by retired General Raymond Horgues-Debat: "France-Europe-Security"]

[Text] Whatever the difficulties encountered in the building of a European Political Union, it cannot reasonably be denied that Europe does exist in fact, by the originality of its civilization, a broad community of interests; the problem is to persuade the Europeans fully of this, and to restore to them the will and courage to preserve this personality, to get them to take their own security in hand, which, for that matter, will also win them a wider freedom of political action.

It is, indeed, eminently regrettable that with its roughly 300 million inhabitatns, its intellectual, industrial and agricultural potential, Europe expects 200 million Americans to protect it against 270 million Soviets, and that its political clout throughout the world is not in keeping with its potential. Various explanations have been given for this self-effacement on Europe's part:

- --a French economist has said that Europe will build itself by means of money or will not be built;
- --a member of the English Labour Party has spoken of the necessity of a European "social dimension";
- --a German conservative has cited the powerlessness of the responsible political authorities in the face of the excessive pressure from certain socioeconomic groups;

and on the grounds of Great Britain's insular particularism, the FRG's Ost-politik temptations, etc, the possibility of making progress, in the absence of a true political union, is denied in advance.

Everyone seems to agree, though, in regretting the absence of a truly European mentality.

Despite intense political and diplomatic activity at the highest levels, Europe at the level of the masses gives, in effect, the impression of marking time, because it has not yet been possible to give concrete form to any of the dreams that it had dreamed, in either the political, economic, cultural

or military areas, and the public no longer believes in them! On the contrary, it is nearly traumatized by media that develop heavily the relatively minor quarrels over mackerel, sheep or wine, thus showing a Europe definitively incapable of overcoming its internal contradictions; but these media are maintaining a remarkable reserve on the community of interests of the European countries and on the considerable advantages that they could draw from their union, in the face of the serious problems that they have or will have to face in an increasingly unstable world. But one might think that a good many dificulties would be partly lifted with the comprehension and support of a public opinion properly and regularly informed, and public opinion is indeed made!

It might be thought that even in the absence of a political union, there are areas in which entente would be possible in order to arrive at some concrete achievements, and that any result, as minimal as it might be, would help to lay the foundations of a "European feeling" and would then make it possible to make better progress on the way toward political union.

The most favorable area for doing this is perhaps that of security, for the mass of people are already sensitized to it; they perceive the interest and possibility of an entente more easily, because the threats are well-known, the anxieties are real, and military solutions have already been experimented with.

Need these threats be reviewed?

First of all, there is the presence, in the East, of a Soviet Army of impressive volume and capacity. Some have said that Russia has always had an insecurity complex, which explained its constant concern about protection and coverage of its borders. This no longer seems true today, with the military superiority acquired by the USSR in the European theater, with the multipurpose and planetary dimension that the Soviet forces have taken on through the extraordinary development of their Navy, their Air Force, their long-range logistical means, and by their efforts in the conquest of space.

There are also the effects of an indirect strategy of outflanking and destabilization, which, it can never be repeated enough, is characteristic of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

Thus Europe, with eastern borders already fixed, must increasingly be anxious, externally, about its sources of supply and its communication routes, and internally, must fight the attempts to demobilize is will to defense, which are leading to a general crisis of solidarity and confidence.

Finally, there is the emergence of the countries of the Third World, whose riches are more an element of blackmail and pressure than a means for establishing better flows of exchange. These countries have thus become political stakes in many cases, a favored ground for confrontations, any of which can constitute a detonator in the ongoing struggle for influence waged by the superpowers.

In the face of these threats, it is obvious that a country on the scale of France cannot do a great deal, and it shows blindness or bad faith to pretend to set up a system of forces capable of neutralizing them. But what one country alone cannot do, Europe could do.

While this ideal solution to the problems of security is awaited, France can nonetheless conceive an original system that would guarantee a minimum effectiveness without compromising a desirable evolution toward a European system.

This system should be articulated around two principal components—components which, moreover, already exist, but are perhaps not entirely adapted to their mission.

First Component: the Strategic Forces

These today are our nuclear weapons of deterrence, which have acquired a certain credibility that must be maintained and developed. For this purpose, it is necessary to conserve a certain technological level that has been reached, and one that cannot be limited to the nuclear domain, for that matter. On the contrary, it would be a good idea to make thorough use of the grey-matter potential that we have in order to seek a technological breakthrough in other areas—chemical, biological or—why not?—psychological. Such a breakthrough would doubtlessly guarantee quite a bit better a deterrent effect.

Next, it is necessary to guarantee the total safety of these forces, which assumes, on the one hand, a diversification of the means, and on the other, effective protection of the means. And this is not a minor problem, in view of the vulnerability of this system of forces (by which we mean not only the means themselves, but especially the environment in which they are put into action) and in view of the considerable progress achieved in sabotage actions.

The existence of these deterrent forces certainly implies the organization of "civil protection," and although this question has already been the subject of some serious studies that have shown the possibility of civil protection but that unfortunately have not been able to get the circulation desirable, it nevertheless remains to be debated, in view of both the psychological impact and the financial impact on the populations concerned and on the adversary.

Would they, in effect, demonstrate our readiness to go all the way in our deterrent action, protected, as we would be, from eventual reprisals, or would they, on the contrary, demonstrate our lack of confidence in this action and our consequent fear of seeing it fail and suffering the enemy strikes?

The decision is above all a political one.

Second Component: the Tactical Forces

These are the Battle Corps (CB), the so-called Rapid-Action Forces (FAR) and the Territorial Forces (FT).

The CB is, by far, the main element in this group.

It is viewed as extending the deterrent action of the strategic forces in the Central European theater, but it is doubtful that its contribution is a very positive one at its present qualitative and quantitative level. Of course, any increase in our defense potential increases our deterrent power by the same token; one does not willingly attack a strong opponent!

By definition, though, a nuclear deterrent force is not built in order to be used; if it is used, it has not fulfilled its role. Is it reasonable, then, to think that the battle corps can constitute a deterrent element, and that one could envision accepting battle and hoping to win it, with or without the use of tactical nuclear weapons?

The disproportion between the forces involved seems far too great.

On the one side are a few light divisions consisting essentially of recruits doing less than a year of service, trained in a cautious and niggardly way, since the command is preoccupied with its budget limits, the well-being of its troops, the fear of possible accidents and the way in which the media would immediately exploit them! A public opinion beleaguered by pacifist and even defeatist movements that depict military service as useless hazing, which many recruits try to avoid by special assignments. A public opinion that supports or tolerates all undertakings aimed at hindering or limiting military activities (consider the problem of the camps for maneuvers).

On the other side are more than a hundred divisions consisting mainly of active-duty personnel (2 to 3 years of service), trained constantly in maneuvers of a scope and realism absolutely inconceivable for us!

A public opinion politically indoctrinated and daily instructed about the power of the Red Army and the nobility of its mission.

How, under these conditions, can one purport to wage a defensive battle, even with the support of tactical nuclear weapons, with the aim of "winning the time necessary for political maneuvers, while at the same time demonstrating to the adversary our determination to move on, if need be, to the strategic nuclear level"?

Such a battle is not described as a "reprimand" or a step up within the framework of a "graduated response," or even the framework of a "nuclear defensive screen"; it is declared, rather, that what is sought is "an effective and sharp military effect, limited in time and space, and unambiguously constituting a 'last warning,' falling within a large range of possible patterns of battle."

Isn't this reasoning a little specious? Do people really believe, knowing the adversary as one does, that after this "last warning" he is going to pick up his marbles and try another maneuver in the same style, or that he is going to let himself be intimidated and accept negotiation?

One could believe rather that, thinking on the basis of our initiative in nuclear weaponry, he would be quick to move up to the higher level himself and eliminate by a massive strike (for which he has the means) all possibility of further action on our part.

The CB therefore represents, in the present state of affairs, an insufficient pledge of our security, an ineffective solution to the highly varied problems posed by this security.

Let us look at the rapid-assistance forces.

They are limited to the value of a few mechanized and paratroop regiments, with insufficient naval and air support: logistical support of them would raise some definite difficulties, which means that their range and effectiveness are far from being up to the level of the role that France should play in the world. One cannot help but be struck by the volume and power gap between:

--on the one hand, a battle corps which, despite its weakness, nonetheless represents the main part of French operational capacities, while eventual use of it is limited to the Central European theater and such use is improbable for so long as the deterrent effect of the allied forces of NATO remains valid;

--on the other hand, the rapid-assistance forces, whose operational capacities are obviously quite a bit less, whereas it is they that are assigned the mission of coping at all times with the crises that can arise anywhere in the world that French interests could be threatened. Herein, it seems, lies a lack of realism in analysis of the needs, resulting in a flagrant imbalance in the means, if one considers the magnitude of the threats with which, respectively, they must cope.

Finally, we go on to the territorial forces.

A reoganization of these forces has been carried out recently; prevously treated as poor relations, they are now to be able to combine with the CB.

Does their input really change the relationship of forces?

Could they really modify the evolution and outcome of a major conflict in Europe? The most elementary common sense must certainly lead to a negative answer.

On the other hand, they would have a decisive role to play in maintenance of order and for the administration to be able to function freely in the event of crisis. Indeed, in view of the chaos that results from certain accidents or catastrophes, electric-power outages, roads blocked by a few trees downed by tornados, railways blocked by snowstorms, etc, one can imagine the panic that would smother the country in the event of generalized bombing and sabotage.

The ORSEC [Relief Organization] plans already have a lot of trouble coordinating the many services that normally ignore one another or, at any rate,

hardly have the habit of obeying and working under the same chief, who also generally does not have, at the time of need, a qualified staff. What would the situation be like in wartime, when communications of all types would be systematically targeted and destroyed, which would entail an ineluctable total decentralization of relief operations?

The territorial forces, suitably trained and staffed, should, instead of merging into the battle corps, prevent chaos and make possible the continuity of the state and the survival of the nation.

We are therefore forced to note that:

- 1) we are faced with a flagrant imbalance in favor of the adversary;
- 2) our means are little-adapted, or poorly adapted, to our needs, and the desirable volume of these means is far beyond what the national will is presently agreeable to producing;
- 3) public opinion is not ready to make the sacrifices necessary to our security, and the slogan "anything but death" gets wider circulation than do the country's appeals.

The consequences have to be drawn from this.

- 1) Only the strategic forces are capable, under certain conditions, of giving us a minimum guarantee in the safeguarding of our defenses;
- 2) Only our intellectual and technological potential—and better still, that of Europe—can enable us to develop this guarantee;
- 3) One cannot, in all reasonableness, count on the capacity of the nation to make up for the insufficiencies of our preparation in the event of serious crisis;
- 4) Only a European entente can enable us to conceive and set up a defense system proportionate to the scale of the threats.

What can be concluded from this?

- 1) France obviously must, in cooperation with its European associates, maintain and develop its strategic forces while bringing all its efforts to bear on an attempt at a technological breakthrough. But it is up to France to seek and propose, in parallel, the political solution that will make these forces the nucleus of a future European defense, clearly declaring its will to fight with all its forces for defense of the European space that would thenceforth be sanctuarized. It could then profit from the technical and financial aid of its neighbors, on condition of convincing them of its good faith and its effectiveness.
- 2) France, like Europe, must face up to threats from "any and all directions." To the east, it should be capable of deterring and, if necessary, containing aggression by the Warsaw Pact forces. But it should also avoid the asphyxia it would be threatened with through paralysis or destruction of

its sources of supply and its communications routes--a threat that in the present situation is the most dangerous one.

It is therefore necessary for it to adapt its means and transform its battle corps and its intervention force into a single Mobile Armed Force, 100-percent operational and capable of acting without delay, in whole or in part, in Europe as well as outside Europe, wherever the political powers have no other outcome than action by force. This FAM [Mobile Armed Force] is therefore not at all comparable to our battle corps, which is designed solely to mount guard against the East; it should be considered a necessary tool in the hands of the government when the diplomatic means have failed:

- --in order to back up the will to make oneself understood and respected throughout the world;
- --in order to prevent any attack against our vital interests;
- --in order to settle a localized and limited conflict, within the framework of our political obligations, without seriously jeopardizing the economic and social equilibrium of the country.

This force would therefore have to be capable of outclassing the adversary in the type of conflict for which it was conceived (the principle of making the means adequate to the mission).

Its level would consequently be a condition for the level of our political aspirations; and this point is a very important one, because the political powers, which are not inclined to make the desired sacrifices in advance, sometimes become too late aware of the restrictions and limits on the means at their disposal.

This force should therefore have the benefit of the most recent progress in science, which alone, at this time, enables the big industrial countries to avoid risking an uncertain fight with adversaries that are called "developing" ones but that are also as well-equipped as they are, since they are offered their best weapons and, in addition, have available to them a manpower potential that is larger—and more "disposable."

Such a force could, of course, constitute the spearhead of a powerful European force, enabling Europe to take in hand itself the defense of its own interests everywhere in the world, at the same time as it would become, within the Atlantic Alliance, a more reliable partner, and would thus play a political role commensurate with its true worth.

3) Finally, in order to ensure continutiy of the life of the country and its internal security, specialized units are necessary, judiciously distributed over the territory and not needing any heavy and sophisticated weapons.

It is by means of short-term national service that the territorial forces could acquire the necessary training: civic education and physical training, rescue techniques, shooting practice with all individual weapons. They would be articulated and organized in peacetime in order for the public authorities

to be assured of having reliable and well-suited means available without delay--means that are normally so difficult to find and deal with when the needs exceed the local possibilities.

It should also be noted that such a service would squelch all the criticisms too often formulated about the service as it is at present. The recruits would more readily accept an interruption of their civilian activity lasting only 2 to 3 months; they would receive mental and technical training that would, happily, work against the attempts at subversion to which they are constantly subjected, and they would have the feeling of being usefully instructed about real needs, for the good of their country, in close contact with the population.

#### Conclusion

Strategic forces, tactical forces, territorial forces—here, then, is a defense organization making it possible to adjust the means to the missions as well as possible, within the framework of our possibilities. Not only does it not rule out the possibility of association with other European countries; but even the form of this organization itself encourages such collaboration, inasmuch as it responds to needs that are not only clearly national.

While creation of a European Political Union is awaited, such an association on the military level would prove first of all that Europe refuses to stand by as a spectator as history unfolds and let the superpowers continue to govern the world in the spirit of Yalta. Such an association would also reassure public opinion against the rise of terrorism and Soviet imperialism, and would make it become aware of a European reality. The desire to live, the taste for doing things, the will to hope, could once again characterize European civilization.

11267 CSO; 3519/545

**END**